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SALVAGING THE OPPORTUNITY: A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSOR CLARK 
Michael J. Yelnosky* 
In this Article, Professor Yelnosky responds to Professor Clark's criti-
que of his previous article, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers 
to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, 
Entry-Level Jobs. Professor Yelnosky first clarifies that Professor 
Clark has adopted several of the points Professor Yelnosky originally 
made in his earlier article. He then responds to the portions of 
Professor Clark's article that challenge his prior conclusions. He 
builds on and defends his previous arguments that: (1) testing is best 
suited to uncover hiring discrimination for lower-skilled jobs; (2) disi-
ncentives to bringing tester lawsuits make it unwise to rely on private 
parties and organizations to use testers sufficiently; (3) the EEOC 
currently lacks the statutory authority to engage in or fund testing for 
employment discrimination; and (4) Congress should amend Title VII 
to expressly authorize EEOC participation in testing. Professor Yelnos-
ky discusses the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIPJ as a poten-
tial model statutory framework. FHIP authorized the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund testing by 
private groups and individuals and has proven to be an effective and 
popular program for combatting housing discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
Unfortunately, Professor Clark has not acknowledged the 
many ways in which his reply1 to my earlier article2 borrows 
from my work. To minimize any misunderstanding of the 
content of my article created by Professor Clark's char-
acterization, I feel compelled first to summarize my earlier 
* Assistant Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.S. 1982, 
University of Vermont; J.D. 1987, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
My thanks to Andrew Horwitz and Jonathan Mintz for their comments on a draft 
of this Article. Amy Foran also provided her characteristically thorough evaluation 
of a draft. David Bagus's research assistance was invaluable. Thanks also to the 
editorial board and staff of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for 
their technical support and editorial suggestions. 
1. Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing 
and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1994). 
2. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover 
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower·Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 403 (1993). 
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article.3 A summary also helps to identify the issues on which 
Professor Clark and I genuinely disagree. Those issues will 
be the primary focus of this response. 
In my earlier article, I asserted that employment dis-
crimination is still widespread.4 I identified reasons why less 
than an optimal number of Title VII cases challenging hiring 
decisions have been filed. 5 I opined that this difference be-
tween the optimal and actual number of cases challenging 
hiring decisions, which I described as an "enforcement void," 
was greatest with respect to cases challenging hiring deci-
sions involving lower-skilled, entry-level jobs.6 I suggested 
that the use of testers 7 might be an effective technique to fill 
this enforcement void.8 The technique appeared promising 
because it could generate meaningful evidence· of discrim-
ination while imposing few costs on the "tested" employers.9 
Furthermore, I concluded that a tester who is not considered 
equally for employment with other applicants on the basis of 
a prohibited characteristic has standing to sue under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 In support of this con-
clusion, I showed that Congress created a right under Title 
VII to be considered for employment regardless of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. That right does not depend 
on the applicant's willingness to entertain a job offer.11 
In his reply to my article, Professor Clark argues, as I did, 
that there is reason to believe that employment discrimina-
tion persists. 12 He argues, as I did, that special obstacles to 
suit help explain why Title VII is used more often to 
3. My prior work speaks for itself, but some readers' thirst for information 
about testing for hiring discrimination may be quenched by reading the two Articles 
in this volume. 
4. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410. 
5. Id. at 410-11. 
6. Id. at 410-13. 
7. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines testers as 
"individuals who apply for employment which they do not intend to accept, for the 
sole purpose of uncovering unlawful discriminatory hiring practices." Notice No. N-
915-062, (2 Interpretations] EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) 'I 2168, at 2313-15 (Nov. 20, 
1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance]. 
8. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 413-15. 
9. Id. at 414. 
10. Id. at 415; Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Prohibited characteristics 
under Title VII are race, color; religion, sex, and national origin. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (1988). 
li. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 415-29. 
12. Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 2-3 with Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410. 
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challenge discharges than hiring decisions. 13 He argues, as I 
did, that using testers may be an effective means of uncover-
ing hiring discrimination. 14 He argues, as I did, that testers 
have standing to sue under Title VII to enforce their -right to 
equal treatment. 15 
After I concluded that testers who receive disparate treat-
ment have standing to sue under Title VII, I suggested that 
because of certain obstacles, relying on private groups and 
individuals to use testers to fill the enforcement void might 
be unwise. 16 I speculated that while the law in this area was 
murky, testers might be threatened with common-law liabili-
ty for breach of contract or fraud, and that lawyers intimate-
ly involved in recruiting, training, and orchestrating testers 
for purposes of litigation might be threatened by possible 
breaches of the rules of professional responsibility. 17 I sug-
gested that these threats might deter the use of testers. 18 I 
also predicted that testers might be underutilized because of 
legal doctrines that could limit the available relief, including 
attorneys' fees. 19 
13: Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 5 with Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 411-13. 
14. Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 6 with_Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 4i3-15. 
15. Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 10-20 with Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 
415-29. Sub silentio, Professor Clark has adopted my positions as his own, and at 
other times he misrepresents my previous work by suggesting his positions on these 
issues are contrary to mine. Although Professor Clark acknowledges that he agrees 
with my conclusion that testers have standing to sue under Title VII, Clark, supra 
note 1, at 7 n.31, not once does he cite to my prior analysis in reaching the same 
conclusion. For example, he does not acknowledge that I argued, as he now does, 
that under the analysis articulated by William Fletcher in William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988), testers have standing to sue under 
Title VII. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 417-29. 
My hunch is that his role as an incorporator of the Fair Employment Council, 
Clark, supra note 1, at 6 n.25, an organization established to "utilize testing to 
address equal employment issues," Roderic V.O. Boggs et al., Use of Testing in Ciuil 
Rights Enforcement, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DIS-
CRIMINATION IN AMERICA 345, 348 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE], has something to do with his desire 
to claim the territory for himself. Regardless, his tactics are more consistent with 
advocacy than scholarship. Cf., Paul F. Campos, Aduocacy & Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 817, 850 (1993) (describing scholarship as communication that derives its 
value from a pursuit of truth and advocacy as communication with no other purpose 
than to achieve some instrumental goal). 
16. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 429-45. 
17. Id. at 446-59. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 429-45. In addition to attorneys' fees, I considered injunctive relief, 
declaratory relief, nominal damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. 
Id. I questioned the soundness of a number of the decisions that limit available 
remedies because they disregard Congress's purpose in Title VII to authorize 
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I expected to find that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC or Commission) could exercise its in-
vestigatory and enforcement power to engage in testing to fill 
the enforcement void. I discovered, however, that Congress 
had intentionally limited the agency's investigatory authority 
and did not grant it the power to use testers to enforce Title 
VII.20 
Thus, I concluded that testing would be an effective means 
of supplementing the current Title VII enforcement scheme. I 
was concerned, however, that private groups and individuals 
would not step in to use testers to fill the enforcement void, 
and I was certain the EEOC did not have the power to use 
testing.21 Therefore, I proposed that Congress amend Title 
VII to authorize the EEOC to use testers to uncover and 
remedy discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level 
positions.22 I favored a "public enforcement" model because 
the EEOC already is authorized to litigate Title VII cases in 
the public interest and because it seemed the most efficient 
way to assure that testing would be used only in instances 
where its potential benefits outweighed its costs.23 I sug-
gested, however, that "the Commission might contract with 
private groups to engage in testing according to standards 
and practices promulgated by the EEOC."24 
Professor Clark questions the wisdom of limiting the use of 
testers to uncovering discrimination in hiring for lower-
skilled, entry-level jobs.25 He does not share my concern that 
private groups and individuals might be deterred from using 
testers,26 and he challenges my conclusion that the EEOC 
does not have the statutory authority to engage in testing.27 
He ultimately agrees with my view, however, that Congress 
should amend Title VII to give the EEOC a special role in 
this area.28 He is concerned, as a matter of public policy, 
about testers making misrepresentations in an uncontolled 
individual plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general to vindicate the rights of 
others. Id. at 438 nn.164-65. 
20. Id. at 459-69. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 469. 
23. Id. at 469-73. 
24. Id. at 470 n.314. 
25. Clark, supra note 1, at 20-23. 
26. Id. at 25-26. 
27. Id. at 37. 
28. Id. at 46. 
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fashion when ostensibly applying for employment. 29 He con-
cludes that Congress should amend Title VII to permit only 
the EEOC or private groups authorized by the EEOC to use 
testers who present false credentials to employers. 30 
Professor Clark's unwillingness to acknowledge our com-
mon ground is disappointing because the EEOC currently is 
reconsidering the methods it historically has employed to 
enforce Title VII and is looking specifically at the role that 
testers could play in a new enforcement focus at the agency.31 
Therefore, it is essential to illuminate further the important 
enforcement issues posed by the use of testers. This response 
to Professor Clark attempts to salvage the opportunity to 
discuss constructively the role that testers could play in a 
new era of Title VII enforcement. 
Part I of this Article responds to Professor Clark's assertion 
that testing should not be limited to uncovering discrimination 
in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level positions as I had 
proposed, but rather should be used to ferret out discrimination 
in hiring for higher-level positions. I argue that Professor 
Clark's enthusiasm for the technique has caused him to ignore 
its inherent limitations. Part II reasserts my concern that it 
might be unwise to assume that private groups and individuals 
will engage in an optimal amount of testing. Part III defends 
my conclusion that the EEOC currently lacks the authority to 
fill the Title VII enforcement void through its own testing. Part 
IV concludes with a discussion of a statutory scheme that 
Congress should consider as a model in incorporating the use 
of testers in the EEOC's enforcement arsenal. To uncover 
housing and mortgage-lending discrimination, Congress 
authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), in the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP),32 to 
29. Id. at 48. 
30. Id. 
31. E.g., Commissioner-Led Tusk Forces Will Probe EEOC's Major Concerns, 
1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 230, at AA-1 (Dec. 2, 1994) (reporting that three 
task forces-focusing on charge processing, alternative dispute resolution, and the 
relationship between the EEOC and state and local fair employment agencies 
-were created by Chairman Gilbert Casselas to "address the major operational 
concerns" at the EEOC); EEOC Chairman Faces Staggering Task With 94,000 
Complaints on Docket, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 206, at AA-1 (Oct. 27, 1994) 
(reporting that EEOC Chairman Casselas characterized testers as a "useful" tool, 
while acknowledging that the EEOC had not yet addressed the possibility of using 
testers in either investigations or litigation). 
32. Fair Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 
§ 561, 101 Stat. 1942 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (Supp. V 1993)). 
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fund testing by private groups and individuals according to 
guidelines and standards set by Congress and the agency. 
Congress should give the EEOC similar authority to use testers 
to uncover and remedy hiring discrimination. 
I. THE Focus ON LOWER-SKILLED, ENTRY-LEVEL JOBS 
I asserted in my earlier article that despite a persistent gap 
in labor force participation between white and black 
workers-attributable in part to discriminatory hiring prac-
tices33-Title VII is used most often to challenge discharges 
rather than hiring decisions.34 I asserted that this anomaly is 
based on several disincentives to suits challenging hiring 
decisions,35 and that the resultant underenforcement problem 
is particularly acute with lower-skilled, entry-level positions.36 
In hiring for such jobs, "'[c]ontact between the applicant and 
the employer ... is typically fleeting,' the eventual outcome 
and the make-up of the applicant pool are unknown to the 
applicant, the applicant knows little about the decisionmakers, 
and 'the process itself rarely signals exclusionary intent.' "37 
Problems of proof, which are present in all hiring cases, may 
be worse with lower-skilled jobs because generally there exists 
little, if any, paper record.38 Moreover, where the job in ques-
tion pays a relatively low wage, potential plaintiffs are less 
likely to have the resources to pay counsel a retainer or an 
33. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410 & n.21. 
34. Id. at 411. For instance, between 1989 and 1991, discharge cases outnumbered 
hiring cases by approximately seven to one. Id. at 411 n.23. 
35. First, discharged employees may be likely to sue to protect the investment 
of time and energy they have made in the firm, whereas an individual discriminated 
against in hiring will have less incentive to sue, especially if she has subsequently 
secured a job. Id. at 412. Second, discharged employees are more likely to have access 
to the information that might lead them to suspect discrimination than those who 
never have been employed by the firm. Id.; see also Ronald Turner, A Look at Title 
Vll's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 237 (1994) (explaining that 
an individual turned down at the hiring stage "most likely will not be in a position 
to shape, and prove, a claim of discrimination" when that individual is not familiar 
with the racial or gender makeup of the prospective employer's work force and does 
not know the reason for, or person behind, the decision not to hire). 
36. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 412-13. 
37. Id. at 412 (quoting Michael Fix et al.,An Overview of Auditing for Discrimina-
tion, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 1, 13-14). 
38. Id. at 412. 
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hourly fee, and the backpay remedy from which a contingency 
fee might come is limited.39 
I suggested that the success of the testing technique in 
identifying housing discrimination makes the technique a 
plausible candidate to help fill the Title VII hiring dis-
crimination enforcement void. 40 The success of testing in the 
housing context seemed easiest to extrapolate to hiring dis-
crimination in lower-skilled, entry-level positions because "the 
hiring process for lower-skilled, entry-level positions is usually 
a summary one, very similar to the rental of a housing unit."41 
As with housing, "'[i]t is possible to monitor ... these transac-
tions without becoming involved in the kind of complex inter-
personal exchanges that would entail outcomes based largely 
on subjective criteria.' "42 Moreover, in selecting among 
applicants for higher-skilled, upper-level positions, an employer 
may expend significantly more time screening, testing, inter-
viewing, and otherwise evaluating candidates' fitness for 
employment. 43 Finally, I noted that feigning the qualifications, 
knowledge, and experience necessary to test for discrimination 
in hiring for some higher-skilled positions posed significant 
problems for recruiting or training effective testers.44 
Professor Clark questions the wisdom of limiting testing to 
lower-skilled, entry-level jobs.45 I certainly agree with his 
assertion that there are reasons to suspect widespread dis-
crimination in hiring for jobs at all levels of the American 
economy.46 I cannot agree, however, with Professor Clark's 
suggestion that using testers to improve the enforcement of 
Title VII in the context of hiring for lower-skilled jobs would 
waste resources.47 First, as Professor Clark acknowledges, in 
39. Id. at 412-13. At the time of my earlier article, I noted that it was too early 
to tell whether the amendments to Title VII permitting awards of compensatory and 
punitive damages, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)), might ameliorate this problem. 
Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 412-13 n.35. Presently, I still am unaware of any empirical 
studies that have addressed the issue. 
40. Id. at 414. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (quoting Fix et al., supra note 37, at 34). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 415. 
45. Clark, supra note 1, at 20-23. 
46. Id. at 3; Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination 
in Employment by Dauid A Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695, 1700-02 (1991). 
47. Professor Clark stated: 
[S)ome economists hypothesize that race and sex discrimination is less present 
in unskilled and blue collar work than for any other kinds of work .... The 
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many cities young unskilled blacks have exceedingly low levels 
of employment, based at least in part on discriminatory hiring 
practices.48 A study conducted by his organization, the Fair 
Employment Council (FEC),49 concluded that young black job 
seekers often were denied lower-level jobs offered to whites 
with similar credentials, and moreover, that the black ap-
plicant often was eliminated from the hiring process at an 
earlier stage than his white counterpart.50 In addition, the 
FEC's own "enforcement testing''51 has focused on lower-skilled, 
entry-level positions.52 · 
tester approach, therefore, could be wasted on the class of employers who engage 
in the least amount of active discrimination in regard to the least attractive jobs, 
when the real underenforcement problem could involve higher-level jobs which 
pay a living wage. 
Clark, supra note 1, at 22. 
48. Id. at 22 n.111. 
49. See supra note 15. 
50. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 410 n.22 (citing Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Fair 
Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., Measuring Employment Discrimination 
Through Controlled Experiments (May 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)). 
51. Enforcement-oriented testing is conducted with subsequent litigation in mind. 
Research-oriented testing is conducted for the purpose of generating data for any 
number of social science purposes. Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 349. 
52. Id. at 368 (acknowledging that as of 1992, "the [FEC's] testing activities ha[d] 
concentrated on jobs for which the necessary hiring qualifications are relatively 
limited"). 
Professor Clark also suggests that testing for lower-level hiring discrimination is 
unnecessary based on his extraordinary assumption that the EEOC is doing an 
adequate job investigating and screening cases involving claims of hiring dis-
crimination in lower-level jobs. Clark, supra note 1, at 21. Professor Clark provides 
no empirical evidence or even anecdotal support for this assumption, which is not 
surprising because there is unanimity among current and former EEOC officials, 
practitioners in the civil rights community, policy makers, and academics that the 
EEOC's charge-processing system is fatally flawed and that change is necessary. In 
June 1993, the departing general counsel of the EEOC stated bluntly that Title VII 
"doesn't work .... [The] EEOC was established ... for the voluntary resolution of 
disputes. But after setting up the administrative mechanism, it was never funded to 
provide those services." Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees Need for New Direction 
at OverwhelmedAgency, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 111, atAA-1(June11, 1993); 
see also EEOC Must Change Approaches to Deal with Growing Workload, Officials Say, 
1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at C-2, C-3 (Aug. 11, 1993) (reporting that in 
August 1993 a former general counsel and several EEOC staffers told an American 
Bar Association committee that the Commission must change the way it does business 
to keep up with the burgeoning workload of employment discrimination charges filed 
with the agency). A Commission official recently stated publicly that the EEOC was 
encountering "the most difficult period in its history." EEOC Official and Attorneys 
Discuss Challenges Posed by Record Charge Rate, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 54, 
at A-13 (Mar. 22, 1994). The interim chair of the EEOC stated in 1994 that "the 
EEOC's workload growth now far surpasses the point where making internal 
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Professor Clark's challenge to my suggestion that disincen-
tives to sue in hiring cases are greater in cases involving lower-
level rather than higher-level positions deserves more serious 
consideration. I did not acknowledge as clearly as I might have 
that individuals who suspect discrimination in hiring for 
upper-level positions are subject to many of the obstacles I 
identified in the lower-level employment context. 53 
I wrote that individuals challenging hiring decisions involv-
ing higher-skilled, upper-level positions have a "greater like-
lihood of success" than those challenging decisions involving 
lower-skilledjobs.54 Professor Clark correctly asserts that these 
individuals also have difficulty proving their cases. Hiring 
decisions for upper-level positions often are based largely on 
adjustments or reorganizing will solve its problems." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
EEOC'S EXPANDING WORKLOAD: INCREASES IN AGE DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER 
CHARGES CALL FOR NEW APPROACH 15 (1994) [hereinafter CALL FOR NEW APPROACH]. 
The head of the EEOC's office of program operations has stated: "[Bly any means we 
use to measure caseload-charge processing time, age ofinventory, caseload size-the 
positive indicators are down and the negative indicators are up." EEOC Budget Up 
by 15. 7 Million as Part of 'lnuestment Package', 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, 
at C-6 (Feb. 9, 1994). 
A prominent plaintiffs' attorney recently told a congressional committee that the 
EEOC "is an absolute waste and should be abolished." Plaintiffs' Attorneys Call for 
More Lawyer lnuoluement in EEO Disputes, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at 
A-3, A-4 (Mar. 25, 1994) (quoting Robert Goodstein); see also CALL FOR NEW AP-
PROACH, supra, at 14 (stating that officials and experts interviewed from both inside 
and outside the EEOC agreed that change is necessary); Clyde Summers, Effectiue 
Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 457, 482 (1992) (stating that "[b)ecause of the Commission's slow rate of 
processing cases and the uncertainty that the Commission will bring suit, the great 
majority of victims rely on private suits rather than on the Commission"). 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently concluded that the extensive 
processing times that charging parties can expect to face appear incompatible with 
the Commission's mandate to ensure equality of opportunity by vigorously enforcing 
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. CALL FOR NEW APPROACH, supra at 
14. It recommended that Congress establish a commission of experts to develop legisla-
tive and administrative means which would enable the EEOC to better carry out its 
mission. Id. at 15. The Senate Special Committee on Aging commissioned the GAO's 
latest audit of the EEOC's charge processing system in response to complaints from 
senior citizens about the length of time it was taking to resolve charges of age 
discrimination in employment. GAO Calls for Outside 'Commission of Experts' to 
Deuelop Strategies to Deal with EEOC Workload, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, 
at A-16 (Feb. 25, 1994). ' 
53. Clark, supra note 1, at 23; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title 
VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 964 (1982) ("Job candidates at the 
managerial and professional level are under strong pressures to avoid being labeled 
troublemakers. An individual decision to engage actively in litigation will usually be 
highly risky, given the low probability of prevailing and the danger of alienating 
present and potential future employers."). 
54. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 415. 
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subjective factors that separate candidates with similar objec-· 
tive qualifications. Employers evaluate a candidate's previous 
work and educational performance to determine whether the 
candidate meets threshold objective requirements;55 they then 
use various procedures to try to evaluate the candidate's 
subjective qualities, such as sincerity, appearance, poise, 
ability to understand and articulate conceptual matters, 
leadership, ability to get along with others, and identification 
with organizational goals. 56 As I mentioned in my original 
article, under the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks,57 a plaintiff must prove that an employer's 
articulated, subjective, nondiscriminatory justification for its 
hiring decision was a pretext for actual discrimination.58 Thus, 
where subjective factors predominate, as they do in hiring for 
higher-skilled, upper-level positions, plaintiffs trying to prove 
discrimination face an uphill battle. 
55. Bartholet, supra note 53, at 955, 973. 
56. Id. at 973, 996 (describing factors weighed heavily by a New York law firm 
and assessment centers). By contrast, in many hiring situations for lower-level 
positions an applicant may be able to show that an employer hires candidates based 
on minimal objective qualifications. Id. at 1001. 
57. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
58. Id. at 2747. Professor Clark also criticizes the disparate treatment model of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), suggesting that it does 
not provide sufficient opportunity for plaintiffs to prove hiring discrimination cases. 
Clark, supra note 1, at 5. According to Professor Clark: 
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case ofracial 
discrimination by alleging that (1) she applied for work for which she was 
qualified; (2) she was turned down; and (3) the employer later hired a person of 
a different race or sex. Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to create an issue ·of fact by showing some 
legitimate reason, not based on race or sex, as to why the plaintiff was not hired. 
The plaintiff must rebut the defendant's reason in order to prevail. 
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Professor Clark's criticism of the McDonnell Douglas 
disparate treatment model is somewhat ironic. Only a few years ago, Professor Clark 
criticized Professor David A. Strauss, who argued that because the Title VII disparate 
treatment model was ineffective, the best way to accomplish the purposes of the 
statute would be to encourage quota hiring. Clark, supra note 46, at 1707-09 
(commenting on David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination 
in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991)). 
Professor Clark wrote that "disparate treatment lawsuits are not nearly so problem-
atic as Strauss implies." Id. at 1696. Professor Clark argued for changes to Title VII 
that would increase incentives to sue. Id. at 1706-07. He stated that "it may be much 
·too early to dismiss the individual lawsuit as a form of behavior control." Id. at 1707. 
Changes to Title VII that increased incentives to sue eventually were enacted in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Nevertheless, Professor 
Clark now seems much less sanguine about the efficacy of the individual lawsuit. 
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At this point, however, Professor Clark and I genuinely 
part company. From his observation that subjective factors 
may play a more important role in hiring for upper-level 
positions than in hiring for lower-level jobs, Professor Clark 
concludes that the "tester approach may be more necessary 
and appropriate for high-level employment."59 This conclusion 
ignores the fact that where subjective factors predominate, 
testing is much less likely to identify discriminatory hiring 
practices effectively. Thus, while Professor Clark and I may 
agree that there is a regrettable enforcement void in the 
context of hiring for higher-skilled, upper-level positions, 
testing does not appear to be a viable enforcement option to 
fill that void. 60 
The success of testing in the housing area suggests that 
testing might effectively be used to identify discrimination in 
hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level jobs because the hiring 
process for such jobs is somewhat like the process for renting 
an apartment or even selling a house.61 Blindly applying the 
housing testing technique to test for discrimination involving 
higher-skilled positions seems inappropriate, however, be-
cause "inore subjective factors legitimately may be considered 
in [those] decisions than in decisions about selling or renting 
housing. "62 The goal in testing is to produce pairs of testers 
identical in all relevant characteristics so that any systematic 
difference in treatment within the pair can be attributed to 
discrimination based on race or sex or any other prohibited 
characteristic. 63 In the area of fair housing, testers typically are 
matched according to relatively few characteristics, such as 
income, age, family size, and housing needs.64 This matching 
59. Clark, supra note 1, at 21. 
60. See John C. Boger, Extending the Reach of the Audit Methodology: Com-
ments, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 399, 403 (explaining 
that to state the limitation that testing works best in evaluating entry-level hiring 
decisions merely acknowledges that the method is only one of a number of com-
plementary civil rights enforcement techniques that can perform some useful tasks). 
61. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 414. 
62. Id. 
63. James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The Urban Institute Audit Studies: 
Their Methods and Findings, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, 
at 187, 190; Alex Y.K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An 
Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 474 (1993)("1n a typical 
testing situation, a black and white tester are paired and sent out to the targeted 
entity with similar, if not identical, qualifications for whatever opportunities the 
entity provides ... so that from the refusal of the black tester alone one can infer a 
discriminatory decision."). 
64. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 190-91. 
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generally eliminates differences in the nondiscriminatory 
factors that might justify disparate treatment of the two 
testers.65 Employment testers, on the other hand, must be 
matched according to· additional factors. Age, appearance, 
education, experience, openness, energy level, verbal skills, 
mannerisms, personality, and interview style all may be 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for refusing to hire an 
individual. 66 
The more factors that might be lawfully relevant to the 
outcome of a particular hiring decision, the more difficult 
accurate matching becomes.67 First, those responsible for 
matching must attempt to identify all the applicant charac-
teristics relevant to the particular firm being tested. Perfect 
matches are impossible where all the worker characteristics 
valued by the firm cannot be identified.68 In hiring for lower-
skilled, entry-level positions it is less likely that firms place 
much weight on characteristics other than those on which 
testers are matched.69 Even if those responsible for matching 
testers could predict accurately the attributes that would be 
dispositive for the hiring decision, it would be impossible in 
many instances involving higher-skilled positions to match 
testers on those attributes. The Urban Institute has recog-
nized this limitation in designing its hiring discrimination 
studies using testers. The Institute instructs testers to with-
draw from consideration for a job if they are asked to take a 
test or attend a training session. 70 This would rule out testing 
for many high-level positions where various personality and 
intelligence tests are given routinely.71 
65. Id.; see also Peter E. Millspaugh, Fair Housing Testing: Its Legal Status 
and Policy Implications, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 223, 229 (1984) (describing how 
testers should be matched to eliminate nondiscriminatory factors). 
66. Bartholet, supra note 53, at 976-77, 996; Heckman & Siegelman, supra 
note 63, at 191; Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 404-05 n.4 (discussing a tester study 
described in MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, 
OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991)). 
67. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 7, at 'I 2168 n.5 (explaining that em-
ployment testers may have a more difficult and elaborate role to play than in the 
housing context because they have the additional burden of appearing qualified for 
the job in question if interviewed). 
68. James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, Response to Comments by John 
Yinger, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 271, 271. 
69. See John Yinger, Audit Methodology: Comments, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVlDENCE, supra note 15, at 259, 265, 268 (recognizing that firms consider more 
characteristics when hiring for upper-level jobs). 
70. TURNER ET AL., supra note 66, at 21, 23. 
71. Richard M. Howe, Minding Your Business: Employer Liability for Invasion 
of Privacy, 7 LAB. LAW. 315, 355 (1991) (reporting that written honesty tests, 
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Further, despite sincere efforts to prepare matched testers 
to respond uniformly in interviews, the substance of applicant 
interviews can be quite variable and random, and the personal 
dynamics that account for a successful interview are difficult 
to plan for and predict. For example, if one considers the hiring 
process for a tenure-track position on a law school faculty, two 
candidates most likely will not be asked identical questions at 
the national hiring conference or at a callback visit to the law 
school. The content of those interviews depends to a large 
extent on the priorities of the individuals who participate on 
any particular day. Individual priorities are not always con-
sistent, particularly when several interviewers are involved 
simultaneously and certain group dynamics exert their in-
fluence. Moreover, matching the scholarly presentations of 
testers would be quite difficult. On the one hand, the presenta-
tions would need to be sufficiently different to avoid detection. 
On the other hand, the presentations would need to be suffi-
ciently similar to be "matched." 
These matching problems-the difficulty in identifying firm-
specific preferences and in matching candidates on highly 
variable and subjective characteristics-have been described 
as the "Achilles heel" of the testing methodology.72 If two tester 
applicants are different with respect to relevant characteristics 
that could not be identified or with respect to identifiable but 
highly variable and subjective characteristics, there is room for 
nondiscriminatory disparate treatment of the two applicants.73 
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that one instance of disparate 
treatment constitutes discrimination.74 Both testers might have 
actually received nondiscriminatory treatment and considera-
tion at that firm. 75 
psychological and personality tests, physical exams, genetic screening, and hand-
writing analysis have become increasingly popular tools in hiring selection). For 
example, a friend of mine recently interviewed for a position in the legal depart-
ment of a Fortune 500 company. The company gave her an intelligence test after 
the field of applicants had been narrowed to approximately five. 
72. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 191. 
73. Id. at 198. 
74. Id. If the protected-class tester has a slight edge in credentials as well as 
other job-relevant characteristics, and the protected-class tester is treated less 
favorably, then an inference of discrimination may be stronger. Boggs et al., supra 
note 15, at 351. Giving the protected-class tester such an "edge" remains problematic, 
however, if all the job-relevant characteristics are not identifiable or if they are highly 
variable and subjective. 
75. See Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 244 (questioning testing meth-
odologies that count all instances of disparate treatment of testers as discrimination); 
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One way to avoid some of these problems is to conduct 
several tests of the same employer to see ifthe protected-class 
testers regularly receive less favorable treatment.76 However, 
because an employer will likely have fewer openings for higher-
level positions, repeat tests might not be feasible. 
Limiting testing for higher-skilled, upper-level hiring dis-
crimination to the early phases of the hiring process likewise 
may not be a viable solution. An attorney for the FEC has 
written that wherever possible, each pair of testers in an 
enforcement test should stay in the process until one is offered 
employment so the other tester can claim that her Title VII 
rights were violated. 77 This position recognizes that the 
relationship between non-outcome aspects of the hiring process 
and discrimination is somewhat tenuous. Being interviewed for 
a shorter period of time or receiving fewer positive comments 
is not necessarily evidence of unlawful disparate treatment. 
One pair ofresearchers suggests that such evidence should not 
ordinarily form the foundation of a discrimination claim. 78 
Thus, the feasibility of testing in employment may not reach 
to higher~skilled, upper-level positions.79 
The increased importance of subjective factors in hiring for 
upper-level positions also raises greater concerns about 
"experimenter effects"80 on the reliability of the testing for dis-
crimination. These effects may be more problematic in higher-
level testing because the contact between the applicant and the 
employer is more intimate and more lengthy, and the outcomes 
Yinger, supra note 69, at 267 (reporting that researchers agree that every instance 
of disparate treatment does not constitute discrimination because there is no simple 
way to distinguish systematic from random unfavorable treatment due to difficulties 
in matching testers on all relevant qualifications). 
76. See Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 355 (noting that it often is appropriate to 
perform repeat tests of the same employer to determine whether the observed 
differences in treatment were isolated or reflect a pattern or practice of discriminatory 
behavior); Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 198 (stating that researchers 
using testers to uncover hiring discrimination might not be able to conclude safely 
that disparate treatment of testers constitutes discrimination until the protected-class 
tester receives detrimental treatment in the aggregate or on average). 
77. Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 361. 
78. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 228 n.8. 
79. See Fix et al., supra note 37, at 61; see also Bartholet, supra note 53, at 999 
(noting that "[s]election systems on the upper level are ... likely to be multifactored 
and discretionary, and therefore more difficult to analyze"). 
80. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 215-16. "Experimenter effects" can 
exist because "'the experimenter is not simply a passive runner of subjects, but can 
actually influence the results' of an experiment." Id. (quoting HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 66 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1975). 
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tend to be based more on subjective factors. During the hiring 
process a tester is not a passive observer. For example, the 
tester can influence the results of the test by responding to 
questions in a subtly negative way or by not making eye 
contact with interviewers.81 Therefore, the conscious and 
subconscious motivations of testers are important. 82 As a 
consequence, when conducting tests for social science research 
some researchers prefer "blind" testing, a program design 
which keeps testers unaware of both the theory being tested 
and the fact that they are working in pairs. 83 As a practical 
matter it would be very difficult to do blind testing, because 
matching testers on several highly subjective characteristics, 
such as openness in interviews, is best accomplished by 
permitting the testers to view each other in simulated inter-
views.84 
81. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991). Focusing on retaffcar negotiations, Ayres 
recognized that in testing for discrimination on the basis ofrace or gender, individual 
differences among the testers might influence the results of a lengthy negotiation, 
even if the negotiating script was standardized. Id. at 825. For example, non-verbal 
behavior inevitably has an impact on the effectiveness of testers: "Salespeople may 
have offered certain testers a higher price not because of their race or gender, but be-
cause they blinked more often or opened the car door more quickly. In the end, the 
results need to be discounted by this residuum of non-uniformity." Id. at 826. 
82. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 215-16; see also Millspaugh, supra 
note 65, at 233-34, 240 (cautioning that where evidence of discrimination is of a more 
elusive nature, objective observation by testers may be impossible due to the 
"formidable psychological and emotional commitment" required from testers); Oh, 
supra note 63, at 499, 503-04 (proposing EEOC oversight of testing activity in 
employment because hiring practices at the interview stage are highly subjective, 
giving testers the opportunity to induce an employer to prefer other applicants by 
"pretending to be inarticulate ... disorganized ... or ... uninterested"). 
In the context of enforcement testing, "testers must be willing to remain in contact 
with the testing program and return occasionally to participate in legal proceedings 
over an extended [time period]." Boggs et al., supra note 15,. at 350-51; see also 
Millspaugh, supra note 65, at 223-24 (stating that because the success of tests rests 
heavily on the indoctrination, training, and rehearsing of dedicated testers, "particip-
ation in fair housing testing may not be suited to those lacking a strong commitment 
to the purpose for which the testing is undertaken"). That commitment from testers 
should be confirmed before testing, which minimizes the possibility of blind testing. 
Moreover, "[a] group that is obviously half black and half white ... will start trainees 
thinking and perhaps making up their own mind about what the study is or how they 
should behave. It makes more sense ... to keep participants from guessing by telling 
them the purpose of the study .... " Yinger, supra note 69, at 260. 
83. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 63, at 216; supra note 82. 
84. Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 351-52 (explaining that after testers receive 
background training they are coached on and practice the details of testing and thus 
during that latter phase "testers who will be paired work closely with and observe 
each other, deyeloping a sense of teamwork and fostering a convergence of their 
personal styles"). 
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Obviously, the dichotomy that I have suggested between 
lower-skilled, entry-level jobs, and higher-skilled, upper-level 
jobs is imprecise and merely descriptive. I believe testing 
should be used to identify hiring discrimination as far "up" the 
employment hierarchy as possible. My suggestion is that 
generally the farther up one goes, the less reliable the testing 
technique may be. Testing for discrimination in hiring for 
higher-level positions raises questions of scientific reliability 
and validitys5 that Professor Clark simply has not addressed. 
Professor Clark's support for the use of testers to uncover 
and remedy discrimination in hiring for higher-skilled, upper-
level positions raises two other important issues: the increased 
costs employers often expend in evaluating persons to fill those 
positions and the increased need for elaborate misrepresenta-
tions by testers to appear qualified for the positions. 
As I mentioned in my original article, in selecting an ap-
plicant for a higher-level position, firms often expend signi-
ficant time and money conducting interviews, administering 
tests, checking references, and conducting other background 
investigations. sG Moreover, because the pool of qualified appli-
cants for these positions can be relatively small,s7 an employer 
may lose a candidate with a bona fide interest in employment 
by focusing its efforts on a tester.ss Because reliable testing for 
discrimination in hiring may be difficult to conduct,s9 tests for 
discrimination in this area may have few benefits. These few 
benefits will not outweigh the costs incurred by many tested 
employers.90 
Professor Clark offers little to alleviate these concerns. While 
he acknowledges that employers must bear additional costs 
associated with verifying the content of applications,91 he 
accepts these costs because testers have Title VII rights to 
equal treatment. He concludes that because testers have 
85. See Boger, supra note 60, at 402 (noting that testing organizations must 
scrupulously adhere to scientifically valid testing procedures). 
86. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 414. 
87. Bartholet, supra note 53, at 1003. 
88. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 415. 
89. See supra notes 61-85 and accompanying text. 
90. See Millspaugh, supra note 65, at 240 (noting that the burden testers place 
on the time, energy, and expenses of tested firms is difficult to justify where testing 
is unwarranted); cf Ayres, supra note 81, at 822 n.18 (describing the features of 
testing for discrimination in negotiations for automobile purchases intended to reduce 
the amount of time a salesperson spent with an individual who had no interest in 
buying a car). 
91. Clark, supra note 1, at 24-25. 
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standing under Title VII, Congress made "an implicit policy 
judgment that testing is a legitimate, approved activity and 
that the benefits of weeding out discrimination outweigh the 
costs to innocent employers who may be subjected to [tes-
ting]."92 As he acknowledges, however, there was "no discussion 
of the tester approach in the legislative history surrounding the 
initial adoption of Title VII."93 Moreover, there is nothing in 
the legislative history of the amendments to Title VII to 
suggest that Congress ever made any judgment on the relative 
costs and benefits of the use of testers to enforce Title VII. 
Professor Clark also seeks to dismiss the cost issue by 
asserting that if testers target only employers who are likely 
to be engaging in discriminatory hiring practices, the number 
of innocent employers tested will be small.94 Identifying those 
firms is easier said than done,95 and without legislative action, 
private groups and individuals are free to target whomever 
they wish for testing. Finally, _ifl am correct that higher-level 
testing tends to be unreliable, there are few, if any, benefits 
to offset the costs to tested employers. 
In addition to imposing additional costs on employers, 
testing for hiring discrimination in higher-skilled, upper-level 
jobs involves more detailed misrepresentations of testers' 
qualifications than testing for lower-level jobs. "To 'appear 
qualified,' testers might find it necessary to present false 
credentials, bogus academic transcripts, made-up work his-
tories, forged letters of reference, faked passports or work 
authorizations, counterfeit licenses, falsified professional 
ratings, perhaps even false security clearances."96 
92. Id. at 24. 
93. Id. at 24 n.118. 
94. Id. at 25. 
95. Professor Clark offers one possible "targeting" technique. He suggests that 
"employers could be targeted for testing when they exhibit a profile with no minority 
or female employees, or serious underrepresentations in certain job categories." Id. 
at 24 n.119. This technique is probably both underinclusive and overinclusive. 
Certainly, many employers without "serious" racial or gender imbalances in their 
workforce may engage in discriminatory hiring practices, and many with such 
imbalances are not discriminating. However, to the extent that this technique would 
reduce the number of tests of employers unlikely to be engaged in discriminatory 
hiring practices, it may be one way to ameliorate the cost problem. 
96. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 407 n.14 (quoting Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris, 
President, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to the Hon. Evan J. Kemp, Chair-
man, EEOC (Feb. 12, 1991), in Equal Employment Advisory Council Letter on 
Proposed Testing Policy at EEOC, 1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at E-2 (Feb. 
14, 1991)). 
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Professor Clark recognizes that testing conducted by pre-
senting matched individuals who possess similar levels of 
education and work experience does not raise the same prob-
lems as misrepresenting testers' qualifications for purposes of 
testing.97 He also acknowledges that it may be difficult to 
find testers "with identical backgrounds, especially if the 
testing is done for high-level employment as proposed in [his] 
Article."98 He concludes that as a matter of public policy, 
misrepresentations should only be permitted for testing in 
limited circumstances.99 Thus, Professor Clark proposes that 
Congress should make it clear that only the EEOC should 
have the authority to engage in or authorize testing that 
depends on numerous significant misrepresentations. 100 
I have asserted all along that coordination by the EEOC is 
desirable in this area. Professor Clark and I disagree over 
whether the EEOC currently is authorized to engage in its 
own testing. He has challenged my conclusion that the EEOC 
currently lacks the statutory authority to do so. His claim 
warrants some comments .. 
II. THE EEOC's INVESTIGATORY AUTHORITY 
Professor Clark challenges my conclusion that the EEOC 
currently may not "employ its own testers or orchestrate the 
use of testers by private groups. "101 To do so he creates a 
straw man. He claims my conclusion is based on "a single 
court decision that determined that the EEOC could not be 
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) because the 
FTCA only authorized suits against criminal law enforcement 
agencies."102 · 
97. Clark, supra note 1, at 46. 
98. Id.; see also Fix et al., supra note 37, at 34 (noting that because hiring for a 
mid-level, white-collar position may be a complex transaction, "testing may be less 
useful a tool unless the testers assume their own identities, which raises compli-
cated recruitment ... issues"). 
99. Clark, supra note 1, at 48. 
100. Id. 
101. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 462. 
102. Clark, supra note 1, at 40 (referring to EEOC v. First Nat'l Bank, 614 F.2d 
1004 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981), discussed in Yelnosky, supra 
note 2, at 462 n.269). 
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His characterization is unfair. I discussed that case in one 
of many footnotes supporting a much simpler and more com-
pelling argument. I argued that the investigatory powers of 
the EEOC were specifically limited and carefully delineated 
by Congress in response to concerns by certain lawmakers 
that a powerful EEOC would infringe on employers' rights. 103 
Therefore, the Commission may not employ an investigative 
technique not authorized by Title VII, even if that technique 
helps the Commission eliminate discrimination in the work-
place. Nowhere in Title VII did Congress even arguably give 
the Commission the power to engage in investigative techni-
ques like testing. When investigating, the Commission is 
authorized only to request from an employer information 
relevant to a charge of discrimination by an employee, and 
the EEOC has subpoena power to enforce compliance with 
those requests. 104 
I also showed that Congress limited the EEOC's power in 
another relevant respect. The Commission has no authority 
to commence an investigation until after a charge of dis-
crimination has been filed. 105 Therefore, even if the Commis-
sion's investigatory power was broad enough to encompass 
the use of testers, the Commission could not employ testers 
to obtain evidence for the purpose of filing a charge of dis-
crimination. 106 
Professor Clark's assertion that the EEOC has authority to 
implement its own testing program to uncover evidence on 
which to base charges of discrimination ignores these 
statutory limitations on the EEOC's power. He cites In re 
Establishment Inspection of Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. 107 for 
the proposition that: 
The general rule is that an agency's investigative authority 
extends to those techniques which are reasonable in the 
light of the enforcement tasks that the agency confronts. 
Where a specific technique is a reasonable extension of a 
103. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 461. See generally id. at 459-69 for my complete 
analysis of the statutory limitations on the EEOC's investigatory authority. 
104. Id. at 460--63 (describing the EEOC procedures for filing a charge). 
105. Id. at 463. 
106. Id. at 463-69. I further argued that the EEOC could not use testers to 
corroborate a charge already filed, because the EEOC must request information 
from employers that it is investigating. Testing would be inconsistent with the 
notice required by the request and subpoena system of Title VII. Id. at 469 n.302. 
107. 13 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1994). 
170 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 28:1 
basic statutory authority to investigate, the federal agency 
"need not have specific regulatory authority for each and 
every one of its inspection and investigational proce-
dures."108 
Professor Clark failed to mention that the court in Kelly-
Springfield was discussing the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA). 109 The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit recently recognized what Professor Clark 
ignores-that the statute authorizing OSHA investigations is 
quite different from the statute authorizing EEOC investiga-
tions. In a case involving an employer's challenge to OSHA's 
investigatory power, the court ruled that the employer's 
reliance on a decision interpreting the EEOC's authority was 
misplaced. 110 The court found that the EEOC decision was 
not "relevant, because the EEOC's subpoena statute differs 
significantly from that of OSHA. The EEOC's authorizing 
statute specifically limits its subpoenas to the investigation 
of discrete charges."111 Unlike some other administrative 
agencies created by Congress, the EEOC may not commence 
a Title VII investigation "'merely on suspicion that the faw is 
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that 
it is not.' "112 
Similarly, the power granted to the EEOC in the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA)113 is much broader 
than that granted to it under Title VIL Under the ADEA, the 
EEOC has investigatory authority independent of the filing of 
a discrimination charge. 114 Thus, "[t]he Commission may, on 
108. Clark, supra note 1, at 42 (quoting Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d at 1164). 
109. Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d at 1164-65. The court's holding was directed to 
OSHA's investigative powers: "OSHA need not have express authority for each and 
every investigative technique." Id. 
110. Reich v. Montana Sulphur & Chem. Co., 32 F.3d 440 (9th Cir. 1994). 
111. Id. at 446 (citing EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., 569 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978); 
EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
112. Alyeska Pipeline, 836 F.2d at 447 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 
338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950)) (comparing the broad investigatory power of the EPA to 
the more narrow authority of the EEOC). 
113. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
114. See EEOC v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1992). 
The ADEA gives the EEOC "the power to make investigations ... in accordance with 
the powers and procedures provided in [the Fair Labor Standards Act]." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(a) (1988). That power derived from the ADEA permits the EEOC to "investigate 
and gather data" and to "enter and inspect [work] places and ... records, ... question 
such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as ... 
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its own initiative, conduct investigations" of ADEA viola-
tions, 115 and "[u]nlike the limited authority given the EEOC 
under Title VII, ... the ADEA gives the EEOC authority to 
investigate and enforce independent of individual employee 
charges."116 
Perhaps recognizing that his argument disregards the 
express limits in Title VII on the EEOC's power to investigate, 
Professor Clark ultimately suggests that the use of testers is 
not an "investigation" under Title VII and that the technique 
is a "reasonable extension" of the power to investigate.117 He 
cites no direct support, however, for the assertion that testing 
is not an investigation within the meaning of the statute. It is 
irrelevant that sending testers to an employer may not be 
particularly intrusive. The statute simply does not authorize 
it. 118 Congress specifically limited the EEOC's authority when 
necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision 
... or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions .... " 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) 
(1988). To enforce the ADEA the EEOC may: 
(1) investigate and gather data; (2) enter and inspect establishments and 
records and make transcripts thereof; (3) interview employees; (4) impose on 
persons subject to the Act appropriate recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments; (5) advise employers, employment agencies and labor organizations 
with regard to their obligations under the Act and any changes necessary in 
their policies, practices and procedures to assure compliance with the Act; 
[and] (6) subpoena witnesses and require the production of documents and 
other evidence . . . . 
29 C.F.R. § 1626.15(a) (1994). In contrast, the EEOC's regulations for investigating 
charges filed under Title VII are more limited. They authorize the agency to request 
statements from the charging party, conduct a fact-finding conference, and issue 
subpoenas to enforce requests for (1) the testimony of witnesses, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.15 (1994); (2) the production of evidence under a subpoenaed person's 
control; and (3) access to evidence for the purpose of examination and copying. Id. § 
1601.16. But cf. id. § 1601.15(d) (stating that the EEOC's authority to investigate 
"is not limited" to the procedures outlined within this section). 
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (1994). 
116. American & Efird Mills, 964 F.2d at 304; see also Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 
464 n.275 (explaining that although the EEOC's investigatory power under Title VII 
is more limited than that of the Federal Trade Commission or the Wage and Hour 
Administrator, the EEOC nonetheless has broader power under the ADEA). 
117. Clark, supra note 1, at 42. 
118. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 461-62 n.267 (citing EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 
382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974) (concluding that the EEOC did not have the authority 
to serve interrogatories on an employer during the investigation of a charge because 
the statute did not permit it); cf Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 
455, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that an agency cannot use an investigative 
technique that is not authorized by statute). 
Professor Clark also appears to suggest that I erroneously concluded that EEOC 
testing would violate the Fourth Amendment. Clark, supra note 1, at 40. He states: 
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it created and later amended Title VII. Wishing the statute 
was drafted differently does not make it so. The Commission 
simply "is not empowered to conduct general fact-finding 
missions concerning the affairs of the nation's work force and 
employers. "119 
Professor Clark's challenge to my conclusion that the 
EEOC may not orchestrate enforcement testing by others120 is 
The activity of the EEOC is unlikely to exceed the bounds of the Fourth 
Amendment. Professor Yelnosky fails to consider that the judiciary's exertion 
of constitutional control and its imposition of a standard requiring express 
statutory authority varies with . . . the degree of intrusiveness of the in-
vestigative techniques on citizens' liberty, property, and privacy. 
Id. If this is what Professor Clark is suggesting, he did not read my original article 
carefully. I stated that "[t]here also would be no Fourth Amendment bar to the use 
of testers by the EEOC." Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 480 n.363. Furthermore, I 
discussed this conclusion in some detail. Id. 
119. EEOC v. Ocean City Police Dep't, 820 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir. 1987) (decli-
ning to order enforcement of an EEOC subpoena based on an invalid charge), vacated 
on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1'019 (1988). The court also stated that "[t]he only 
legitimate purpose for an EEOC investigation is to prepare for action against an 
employer charged with employment discrimination, or to drop the matter entirely if 
the ... charge ... [is] unfounded." Id. In 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit cited this same statement from Ocean City Police Deparment to demonstrate 
the limits of the EEOC's investigatory powers under Title VII. American & Efird 
Mills, 964 F.2d at 304 (distinguishing Ocean City Police Dep't on the grounds that 
Title VII limits the investigative authority of the EEOC in the absence of any 
independent statutory authority like that granted under the ADEA). 
Professor Clark also asserts that under Service Founding Co. v. Donovan, 721 F.2d 
492 (5th Cir. 1983), the EEOC could engage in testing to verify the accuracy ofEE0-1 
reports submitted to the EEOC. Clark, supra note 1, at 44-45 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-8(c)(3) (1988)). Assuming, arguendo, that Service Foundirig, which involved 
OSHA's power, applies to the EEOC, the enforcement testing Professor Clark and I 
have been discussing would not be conducted simply to verify the content of EE0-1 
reports. EE0-1 reports are filed annually by employers oflOO or more employees and 
detail the racial and gender composition of their work forces by job classification. 29 
C.F.R. § 1602. 7 (1994). Testing could not confirm, for example, that 20% ofa reporting 
employer's clerical workers are black or female. Testing is conducted to determine 
whether the employer is engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. 
120. Clark, supra note 1, at 38-40. Professor Clark also points to statutory 
provisions which he asserts give the EEOC authority to assist employers in struc-
turing internal testing programs and to engage in research to determine the extent 
of hiring discrimination. Id. 
Here I agree with Professor Clark. I have never suggested that the EEOC 
currently is not authorized to assist employers interested in structuring internal 
testing programs. The EEOC has the power "to furnish to persons subject to this 
subchapter such technical assistance as they may request to further their com-
pliance with this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(3) (1988). 
The EEOC also may use its own testers to research the extent of hiring dis-
crimination or, with funds appropriated by Congress, finance the use of testers by 
others to conduct similar research. The Commission may "make such technical 
studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of this subchapter 
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likewise not persuasive. Professor Clark argues that under 
section 2000e-8(b), 121 "[i]t is ... possible that the Commission 
has the statutory authority to help finance a testing program 
undertaken by a state agency."122 In making this argument, 
Professor Clark ignores the fact that the Commission's power 
under section 2000e-8(b) to "contribute to the cost of research 
and other projects of mutual interest undertaken by" state 
and local fair employment agencies is limited to the expendi-
ture "of funds appropriated specifically for such purpose."123 
Even if enforcement testing fits within the definition of "re-
search and other projects," unless Congress appropriated 
money to the EEOC for it to assist state agencies in enforce-
ment testing, the EEOC may not do so. 
Similarly, contrary to Professor Clark's assertion, 124 the 
EEOC does not appear to have the authority under section 
2000e-4G)(l) to train private organizations that desire to set 
up testing programs. That provision requires the Commission 
to establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute (TATI) 
"through which the Commission shall provide technical assis-
tance and training regarding the laws and regulations enforced 
by the Commission."125 The provision was intended to ensure 
that individuals and firms subject to Title VII received infor-
mation that would help them comply with the law. There is 
nothing in the language of the statute or in the legislative 
history to suggest that TATI would be used to supplement 
the enforcement activities of private groups and individuals. 
In fact, the TATI was established at least in part to 
encourage voluntary compliance with Title VII in order to 
and ... make the results of such studies available to the public." Id. § 2000e-4(g)(5). 
However, this statutory provision does not authorize enforcement testing. 
121. In conducting its investigations, the Commission is authorized to 
cooperate with State and local agencies charged with the administration of 
State fair employment practices laws and, with the consent of such agencies, 
may, for the purpose of carrying out its functions and duties under this sub-
chapter and within the limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such 
purpose, engage in and contribute to the cost of research and other projects of 
mutual interest undertaken by such agencies .... 
Id. § 2000e-8(b). 
122. Clark, supra note 1, at 38 n.192 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1988)). 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1988) (emphasis added). 
124. Clark, supra note 1, at 39. 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(j)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
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reduce the need for enforcement activity by the EEOC and 
others.126 
Professor Clark also relies on section 2000e-4(g)(l) in support 
of his assertion that the EEOC currently has the authority to 
orchestrate the use of testers by others. There, Congress gave 
the EEOC the power "to cooperate with and, with their con-
sent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies, both 
public and private, and individuals."127 Professor Clark writes 
that "[t]his provision provides a reasonable basis to argue that 
the EEOC is empowered to work with private individuals, 
private organizations like the Fair Employment Council, and 
even state agencies" to target and test employers for hiring 
discrimination that have work forces in which minorities and 
women seem to be underrepresented.128 However "reasonable" 
Professor Clark's argument might be, it ignores the fact, as I 
previously set forth, that Congress specifically limited the 
EEOC's Title VII investigatory authority. That . limited 
authority simply does not include the power to engage in 
enforcement testing. Congress likely would not have 
empowered the EEOC to authorize third parties to do some-
126. "An employer or other entity covered" is not excused from compliance with 
Title VII "because of any failure to receive technical assistance under this subsec-
tion." Id. § 2000e-4(j)(2) (emphasis added); 138 CONG. REC. S16,312-03 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("My hope is that as a result of the 
increased education, training, and technical assistance ... [employer] compliance 
... will be improved."). 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(l) (1988). Professor Clark also suggests that this 
provision might permit the EEOC to share information obtained from EE0-1 reports 
with state agencies, private groups, and individuals to assist them in targeting 
employers for testing whose work forces reflect an imbalance suggestive of dis-
criminatory hiring practices. See supra note 120. While it might permit the EEOC to 
share EE0-1 information with state and local government agencies, see infra note 136 
(discussing authority for the EEOC to share information with another federal agency), 
section 2000e-8(e) prohibits the EEOC from making "public in any manner whatever 
any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this 
section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such infor-
mation." EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 592 n.l (1983) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e)); id. at 603-04 (holding that a charging party is not a member 
of the public to whom disclosure of information is prohibited ifthat information is in 
the charging party's own Title VII investigation file, but that a charging party is a 
member of the public to whom disclosure is prohibited ifthe information is in another 
party's file, even ifthe information is relevant to the charging party's case). Therefore, 
section 2000e-8(e) prohibits the EEOC from sharing EE0-1 reports with private 
groups or individuals unless they are charging parties and the EE0-1 information is 
in their file. Id. at 604. 
128. Clark, supra note 1, at 38. 
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thing Congress had not permitted the EEOC to do on its 
own.129 
Therefore, when issuing regulations, the EEOC may not 
expand its jurisdiction or otherwise exceed the authority 
granted to it by Congress. Congress gave the Commission the 
power to "issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regula-
tions to carry out the provisions of [Title VII]. "130 The Supreme 
Court has held that EEOC substantive regulations131 are mere-
ly persuasive. 132 . 
Regardless of whether an EEOC regulation coordinating, 
directing, orchestrating, or funding testing by others would be 
deemed substantive or procedural, promulgation of such a rule 
would not be a valid exercise of the EEOC's power. A court will 
defer to EEOC substantive regulations, but only to the extent 
warranted by the thoroughness with which the agency con-
sidered the regulation, the validity of the agency's reasoning 
in support of the regulation, and the extent to which the 
regulation is consistent with earlier and later pronouncements 
of the agency.133 Where the content of a regulation is contrary 
to congressional intent, it is not entitled to any deference. 134 
129. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1163, 1180-81 
(W.D. Pa. 1985) (explaining that the administrative apparatus established by Congress 
for the use of other agencies by the Inspector General "was intended to delegate 
effective power to investigate certain matters within the scope of [the Inspector 
General's} authority") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 
791, 801 (D. Mass. 1956) (explaining that the statutory authority given to a Senate 
subcommittee is the maximum limit on its power because a Senate committee "could 
not delegate what it did not have"); In re Barnes, 116 F. Supp. 464, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 
1953)(explaining that the subpoena power delegated by Congress to an administrative 
agency "must remain within the bounds of the legislative grant . . . and in in-
vestigatory matters should be conferred in express and explicit terms for that 
purpose"); cf. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1189-90 (6th Cir. 
1982) (prohibiting the EPA from using private contractors to inspect regulated 
workplaces for compliance with the Clean Air Act where Congress did not so authorize 
the EPA, even though forbidding the use of contractors might have hampered or 
crippled the inspection program). 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988) (emphasis added). A regulation or rule that 
regulates "the manner in which an administrative agency carries out its ad-
ministrative function and responsibilities ... is to be deemed procedural." Associated 
Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804, 809 (4th Cir. 1983). 
131. "[A] regulation or rule [that] enforces rights or imposes definite obligations 
on the parties ... is ordinarily considered substantive." Associated Dry Goods, 720 
F.2d at 809. 
132. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
133. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
134. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991); Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
at 142-45. 
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Similarly, procedural regulations are valid only if they are 
"reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legisla-
tion. "135 If, by regulation, the EEOC attempted to coordinate, 
direct, orchestrate, or fund testing by others, it would be acting 
contrary to Congress's intent to limit the agency's investigatory 
power. The EEOC cannot expand its investigatory power 
through its rulemaking authority, because the expansion would 
not be reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation. 136 
Thus, I maintain that before the EEOC may conduct its own 
enforcement testing program or orchestrate enforcement 
testing by others, Congress must authorize it to do so. I also 
continue to maintain that one reason Congress should autho-
rize this testing is because of the obstacles to the use of testers 
faced by private individuals and groups. I am still concerned 
that insufficient remedies may be available under current law 
to encourage an optimum amount of private tester litigation. 
135. Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)). 
136. E.g., Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257 (holding that a regulation extend-
ing the reach of Title VII extra territorially had no support in the plain language of 
the statute); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142-45 (holding that a regulation predating the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act that interpreted pregnancy discrimination as dis-
crimination based on sex was not supported by the legislative history of Title VII); 
see Zarr v. Barrow, 800 F.2d 1484, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs exceeded its statutory authority by requiring that applicants for Indian 
Higher Education Grants have at least one-quarter Indian blood); Central Forwarding, 
Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 1266, 1284 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission exceeded its statutory authority in regulating labor compensation in the 
trucking industry); California v. Block, 663 F.2d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
the Department of Agriculture exceeded its authority in regulations defining "gross 
negligence" in connection with the Food Stamps Act); cf Jackson, 961 F.2d at 584-85 
(holding that an EEOC regulation permitting the agency to reconsider a no-cause 
finding and issue a new right-to-sue letter, effectively tolling the 90-day limitations 
period triggered by issuance of the first right-to-sue letter, was valid because {1) it 
facilitated the Commission's processing of charges, (2) Congress intended that 
discrimination claims be resolved administratively, (3) the power to reconsider is 
inherent in the power to decide, and (4) it did not expand the scope of coverage of Title 
VII or create additional rights under the Act); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 
720 F.2d 804, 810-11 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that EEOC procedures for disclosing 
information procured in an investigation to the charging party but not to the 
respondent, unless the charging party decides to commence an action in federal court, 
are valid because they are consistent with the statutory scheme); Emerson Elec. Co. 
v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that a memorandum of 
understanding between the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) 
and the EEOC under which the agencies share information and forward complaints 
where appropriate is a valid procedural rule because Congress intended for them to 
cooperate). 
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Moreover, as I discuss in Part III, testers and their counsel 
might be deterred by state common-law causes of action and 
attorney disciplinary rules that could be used against them.137 
In light of these obstacles, depending on private groups and 
individuals to fill the Title VII enforcement void by using 
testers seems unwise. Professor Clark's challenge to this sug-
gestion has not persuaded me otherwise. 
III. OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF TESTING 
BY PRIVATE PARTIES 
To a large extent, my treatment of the relief issues differs 
from Professor Clark's in emphasis. When I surveyed the law 
in this area, I concluded that under existing doctrine sig-
nificant relief might be denied to prevailing party testers, 
which could result in denial of their requests for attorneys' 
fees. 138 I was not unequivocal. However, in light of the pos-
sibility that testers might be denied significant relief and fees, 
I suggested that as a matter of policy, private groups should 
not be relied on to fill the Title VII enforcement void through 
testing. In contrast, Professor Clark is reluctant to ack-
nowledge the existing law in this area that might be used to 
the detriment of testers. Rather, he suggests there is no reason 
to be concerned about incentives to private tester litigation. 139 
His position seems unduly optimistic and in some instances 
superficial. 
First, Professor Clark attempts to dismiss my concern that 
testers "may not be able to obtain injunctive relief for viola-
tions of their rights under Title VIf"140 My concern springs 
137. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 429-30. 
138. In my original article, I explained in detail the Supreme Court's attorneys' 
fees jurisprudence. Id. at 430-34. Based on the cases surveyed, I concluded that "a 
tester must obtain actual relief on the merits of the claim that materially alters the 
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way 
that directly benefits the tester .... [and) the relief must be more than de minimis 
or purely technical." Id. at 434. Injunctive relief or a substantial damage award would 
satisfy these standards. Professor Clark has not challenged my conclusion that a 
declaratory judgment or a nominal damage award would not. But see infra note 187 
(discussing Professor Clark's suggestion that a declaratory judgment or nominal 
damages might support an award of attorneys' fees). Thus, the following discussion 
focuses on the likelihood of testers obtaining injunctive relief or substantial damages. 
139. Clark, supra note 1, at 25-26. 
140. Id. at 26-28 (discussing Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 435). 
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from an analysis of Title VII cases in which courts had denied 
prevailing plaintiffs injunctive relief. 141 Various justifications 
were offered by courts in support of these decisions denying 
injunctive relief: (1) there was no evidence of widespread, 
pervasive discrimination in the record; (2) there was no . 
evidence that the discriminatory practice that harmed the 
plaintiff would continue in the future; and (3) the plaintiff was 
no longer employed by the defendant and therefore not likely 
to benefit personally from any change in the employer's hiring· 
practices. 142 I suggested that these justifications could be used 
to deny prevailing testers injunctive relief. 
Professor Clark seems to agree. He acknowledges that an 
injunction is mandatory only "when a plaintiff produces 'abun-
dant evidence of a consistent pattern of past discrimination and 
the absence of evidence ... of a reasonable possibility of future 
compliance.' "143 Thus, evidence of widespread discrimination 
may be a prerequisite to an injunction. 144 Moreover, as Profes-
sor Clark further acknowledges, a district court is free to deny 
injunctive relief to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff where 
"something in the record either shows that the employer has 
ended its discrimination in a manner which makes a reoccur-
rence unlikely or which reveals a structural impediment that 
would prevent the plaintiff or members of her class fro in being 
harmed in the future." 145 
Recognizing that a "structural impediment" to future harm 
may be a basis for denying an injunction to a prevailing Title 
VII plaintiff is acknowledging the point I tried to make in my 
earlier article. I expressed concern that courts may refuse to 
grant prevailing Title VII testers injunctive relief on the 
grounds that they will not personally benefit from any change 
in the employer's practices because testers "are not employees 
of the defendant or likely to become employees."146 
141. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 434-38 & nn.162-65 (citing 16 cases that supported 
my assertion). I took note of one case that held injunctive relief is appropriate 
whenever a Title VII violation is found. Id. at 436 n.162 (citing Berkman v. City of 
New York, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983)). Professor Clark seems comfortable resting 
his analysis on that case rather than the others. Clark, supra note 1, at 26. 
142. Id. 
143. Clark, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting RoBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 207 (1992)). 
144. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 436 n.163. 
145. Clark, supra note 1, at 27. 
146. Id. at 437. Professor Robert Belton, author of the Title VII remedies treatise 
relied on by Professor Clark, agrees that a district court may properly deny injunctive 
relief to a "discriminatee [who] does not seek reinstatement and would not benefit 
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His only response to the suggestion that prevailing testers 
could be denied injunctive relief on those grounds is the 
decision in Fair Employment Council v. BMC Marketing 
Corp. 147 Professor Clark reads that decision as permitting 
tester plaintiffs, who received allegedly discriminatory treat-
ment from an employment agency, to amend the portion of 
their complaint seeking injunctive relief to include averments 
that they were likely to return to the employment agency in 
the near future as bona fide applicants and that the agency 
had a settled policy of racial discrimination.148 Professor Clark 
misreads the case. The court concluded that the tester plain-
tiffs did not have standing149 to sue the defendant employment 
agency for an injunction that would alter the agency's referral 
practices because the tester plaintiffs had not made sufficient 
allegations that they were "threatened with any future 
illegality."150 While the court remanded the case "for the dis-
trict court to exercise its sound discretion over whether to 
permit amendment," the court suggested that an allegation 
that the defendant had a settled policy ofracial discrimination, 
even if coupled with a claim that the plaintiffs actually in-
tended to return to BMC as job applicants, would not be a suf-
ficient indication of a likelihood of future injury .151 The testers 
alleged that their treatment by the defendant was part of" 'a 
personally from the injunctive relief." BELTON, supra note 143, at 208-09 & n.62 
(citing Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
Professor Clark himself acknowledges this is a sufficient basis for denying injunctive 
relief when he cites favorably two cases that I had referred to in my earlier article, 
in which courts held the prevailing Title VII parties were not entitled to an injunction 
because they had voluntarily left the workplace. Clark, supra note 1, at 27 n.133 
(citing Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1990); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 
671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
147. 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
148. Clark, supra note 1, at 27. 
149. The court's use of the "standing" label is unfortunate. As I mentioned in my 
original article, the question of whether a plaintiffs statutory rights were vio-
lated-the standing question-is analytically separate from the question of the relief 
available for that violation. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 427 (maintaining the fact that 
the plaintiff would not have accepted a job offer might affect the remedies available, 
but that it is not relevant to the standing issue). Professor Clark is incorrect in stating 
that I am merely "revisiting the standing question in an altered form." Clark, supra 
note 1, at 25. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in McKennon v. Nash ville 
Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), where it held that after-acquired 
evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in the plaintiffs discharge from 
employment did not bar the plaintiffs ADEA suit challenging her discharge but was 
relevant to the remedies available for any statutory violation. Id. at 883-87. 
150. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1272. 
151. Id. at 1274-75. 
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pattern, practice and policy of employment discrimination on the 
basis of race.' "152 The court said that the plaintiffs' allegations 
did not "indicate that future violation of [the tester plaintiffs'] 
rights is even remotely probable."153 "Their usefulness as testers 
is minimal because they are now known to [defendant] .... 
Their adversarial relationship with [defendant] ... as well as 
their established record as deceivers, make it highly implausible 
that they would ever return as bona fide job seekers."154 
The same rationale could be used in most tester cases. Once 
an employer knows a tester, it is unlikely that the tester could 
be used to test for discrimination by that employer in the fu-
ture. Moreover where testers must misrepresent their 
qualifications to appear qualified, they will not apply to the 
employer as a bona fide applicant. Finally, the court recognized 
that even if the testers could allege that they intended to 
return as candid~tes for employment, they would have no con-
trol over whether they would be subjected to discrimination at 
the hands of the defendant in the future. 155 
The most important point is that the court in BMC Market-
ing did exactly what I had predicted. It held that "[t]o pursue 
an injunction or a declaratory judgment, ... tester plaintiffs 
must allege a likelihood of future violations of their rights 
•••• "
156 Thus, it is undisputable that prevailing-tester plaintiffs 
are not guaranteed injunctive relief that would support an 
award of attorneys' fees. 157 I continue to believe it is unwise to 
cling to a hope that the courts eventually will grant prevailing 
testers full injunctive relief on a widespread scale. 
Professor Clark also challenges my suggestion that testers 
may not be able to overcome these potential obstacles to 




156. Id. at 1273 (second emphasis added). The court's decision to treat the request 
for declaratory reliefand injunctive relief together is problematic. As I mentioned in 
my original article, there is no apparent justification for courts to deny declaratory 
relief under Title VII to a prevailing plaintiff who no longer works for the employer 
and cannot show a likelihood of doing so. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 439-40. Requiring 
a showing of possible future harm for a declaratory judgment ignores the personal 
nature of the remedy. Id. The declaratory judgment serves simply as a determination 
that the defendant violated the plaintiff's rights. Id. 
157. I tried to make it clear in my original article that some decisions denying 
injunctive or declaratory relief to non-employee plaintiffs were probably unsound 
doctrinally, or at least inconsistent with other decisions granting relief to Title VII 
prevailing parties. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 437-38 nn.164-65, 439-40 n.172. 
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injunctive relief through the class action mechanism. 158 I 
asserted that under Supreme Court decisions prohibiting 
"across the board" class actions in Title VII cases, testers who 
do not have a genuine interest in working for the employer 
defendant may not be permitted to represent a plaintiff class 
of bona fide applicants. 159 In East Texas Motor Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 160 the Supreme Court stated that in 
an employment discrimination class action "a class represen-
tative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest 
and suffer the same injury' as the class members."161 Other-
wise, the Court concluded, there is no way to assure the 
named plaintiff will adequately represent those who may 
have been victims of discrimination.162 
In fact, a district court has read Rodriguez in precisely the 
way I suggested. 163 That court held that testers who had 
claimed that they received incomplete information about the 
availability of rental housing because of their race were pro-
hibited from representing a class consisting of individuals 
who also received incomplete information but had a bona fide 
interest in ~ousing in that area.164 The court wrote that 
"[w]hatever injury a tester plaintiff may suffer ... by virtue 
of or attendant to his intelligence-gathering activities, this 
injury is qualitatively different from the injury allegedly 
suffered by [bona fide renters]. "165 The court explained: 
An injured renter plaintiff has allegedly been denied an 
opportunity to rent a dwelling because of his race, there-
by resulting in his living in a segregated neighborhood to 
his detriment; a tester plaintiff asserting a claim for relief 
based upon racial steering ... may likely claim only that 
he has been denied only the "provision of services" be-
cause of his race, as the tester plaintiff has no intent 
whatsoever to rent a dwelling from the person or agency 
he questions. As a different injury ... accrues to a tester 
plaintiff from that which accrues to a renter plaintiff, 
158. Clark, supra note 1, at 28-29. 
159. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 438 n.166. 
160. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
161. Id. at 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208, 216 (1974)) (emphasis added). 
162. Id. at 405-06. 
163. Turner v. A.B. Carter, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 360, 364 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
164. Id. at 366-70. 
165. Id. at 367. 
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such difference will preclude his designation by the Court 
as a class representative for those claiming monetary 
damage from being steered into a racially segregated 
neighborhood.166 
Although courts are not unanimous on this issue, 167 my point 
remains a valid one. The class action vehicle may not be avail-
able to tester plaintiffs who wish to overcome the obstacles 
that exist in individual actions brought by testers. Likewise, 
relying on the opportunity of a sponsoring tester organization 
to sue to obtain significant relief and attorneys' fees seems 
unlikely to result in an optimal amount of testing. 168 As I 
mentioned in my original article, an organization that can 
show it suffered injury as a result of the defendant's alleged 
discriminatory hiring practices would have standing to sue 
under Title Vll. 169 Once again, however, Professor Clark is 
quite sanguine about the BMC Marketing decision, in which 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the FEC 
standing.170 He ignores severe limits placed by the court on the 
types of organizations that would have standing and the relief 
available to them. 
Those limits again suggest to me that relying on private 
groups and individuals to engage in an optimal amount of test-
ing is unwise. The court concluded that the FEC had standing 
based on the allegation that discrimination by the defendant 
agency interfered with the FEC's goals of promoting equal op-
portunity through community outreach, public education, 
counseling, and research projects.171 It rejected the FEC's claim 
that the expense of testing the defendant was an injury that 
would support a claim for organizational standing.172 Thus, the 
standing recognized by the court in BMC Marketing is limited 
to organizations that engage in broad equal employment oppor-
tunity efforts. I am not optimistic that there are a sufficient 
number of organizations nationwide to result in an optimum 
amount of testing. Moreover, the court held that the 
166. Id. (citations omitted). 
167. See Open Rous. Ctr., Inc. v. Samson Management Corp., 152 F.R.D. 472 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting testers to represent a class including individuals who 
actually intended to rent housing). 
168. Clark, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
169. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 424 n.93. 
170. Clark, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
171. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1276. 
172. Id. 
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organization had standing only to redress perceptible harm to 
its programs caused by the defendant's discrimination against 
bona fide job seekers.173 Discrimination against the testers would 
only be evidence of discrimination against bona fide applicants, 
and the organization would thus have to show that discrimina-
tion against bona fide applicants "perceptibly impaired" its non-
testing equal employment opportunity programs. 174 I am 
certainly not convinced this current regime will result in 
sufficient testing to fill the Title VII enforcement void. 
Next, Professor Clark challenges my prediction that pre-
vailing tester plaintiffs may not recover sufficient money 
damages to obtain attorneys' fees. 175 After reviewing awards 
given to prevailing testers in housing cases I opined that 
"testers are likely to recover only modest amounts, which 
may not be sufficient to support a fee award."176 Professor 
Clark responds by saying "[i]t. would not be surprising if 
juries find that erecting discriminatory barriers to employ-
ment is more serious than discrimination in housing, and 
thus warrants higher damages."177 
This wishful thinking seems a flimsy foundation for a policy 
decision about how best to encourage an optimal amount of 
testing. In fact, the FEC and the individual plaintiffs in the 
BMC Marketing case recently settled with the defendant for a 
total of $6000, inclusive of attorneys' fees, compensatory 
damages, and costs. 178 This is certainly not the kind of settle-
ment that will encourage groups to undertake testing. 
173. Id. at 1277. 
174. Id. 
175. Clark, supra note 1, at 25, 31-33. 
176. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 443 (footnote omitted), questioned in Clark, 
supra note 1, at 25, 31-32. Professor Clark asserts that in describing Fair Employ-
ment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Molovinsky, No. 91-7202 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 12, 1993), I mentioned that the jury awarded each of two tester plaintiffs 
$10,000 in punitive damages, Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 443 n.185, but "did not 
further discover that each of the tester plaintiffs recovered an additional $5000 in 
compensatory damages." Clark, supra note 1, at 31 n.156. Although I did not 
discuss the punitive and compensatory damages awards together, on the page 
following my discussion of the punitive damage award in Molouinsky, I mentioned 
that the jury "provided each of (the) two employment tester plaintiffs $5000 in 
compensatory damages for sexual harassment in the course of applying for place-
ment services with an employment agency." Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 444 n.189. 
177. Clark, supra note 1, at 32. 
178. Racial Discrimination: Job Referral Agency Will Pay $6,000 to Settle Bias Suit 
Inuoluing Testers, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at D-10 (Feb. 27, 1995). 
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Moreover, Professor Clark acknowledges that "low awards 
[in housing cases] continue[] in some courts."179 Since my 
original article has been published, the author of a law review 
note surveyed awards in fair housing cases brought by testers 
and concluded that courts rarely award compensatory damages 
in excess of $5000.180 The note catalogued some of the more 
popular reasons expressed to justify lower compensatory 
damage awards to testers than to bona fide house seekers. 181 
Some courts have stated that any injury suffered by testers 
may be offset by the pleasure they derive from participating 
in enforcing the civil rights laws.182 Some have noted that com-
pensatory damages are less important to those testers who 
receive compensation from their sponsoring organization.183 
Finally, some justify the lower awards by noting that the 
testers may be expecting the discrimination.184 Despite 
Professor Clark's hopes, these reasons certainly could be used 
to justify low awards to testers in employment cases. Recogniz-
ing this propensity of courts to make low awards in housing 
cases, the author of the note argued that damages must be 
increased and made easier to collect in tester cases in order to 
encourage increased litigation of tester cases by the private 
and public interest bar.185 This is the simple point I was trying 
to make. 
Punitive damage awards under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
might not solve this problem either. Punitive damages are not 
awarded routinely. Instead, they are available in Title VII 
cases only where the defendant's acts were malicious-
promoted or accompanied by ill will, spite, or grudge-or 
wanton~one in reckless or callous disregard of or indif-
ference to the rights of the plaintiff.186 If the compensatory and 
179. Clark, supra note 1, at 32 n.157. 
180. Alex S. Navarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages for Tester Plaintiffs: An Economic 
Approach to Private Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statutes, 81 GEO. L.J. 2727, 
2748 (1993). 
181. Id. at 2746 nn.89-90. 
182. Id. at 2746 n.89 (citing United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9212, at *26, 1987 WL 18393, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1987)). 
183. Id. at 2746 n.92 (citing Coel, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *17, 1987 WL 18383, 
at *7). 
184. Id. at 2746-47 (citing Davis v. The Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 348 (N.D. 
Ind. 1984)). 
185. Id. at 2745, 2752-53, 2766. 
186. E.g., Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 823 F. Supp. 14 75, 14 79-80 (W.D. Wis. 
1993) (holding that the defendant's failure to conduct an investigation into an alleged 
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punitive damage awards recovered by prevailing employment 
testers are within the $5000 figure, district courts are well 
within their discretion to deny those testers any attorneys' 
fees. 187 Thus, my concern that adequate remedies may not be 
available to promote private tester suits remains. 
Those concerns are not alleviated by Professor Clark's sug-
gestion that attorneys' fees will be available to prevailing 
tester plaintiffs under a 1991 amendment to section 2000e of 
Title Vll. 188 I explored this possibility in my original article 
and concluded that the provision was not intended to app-
ly-nor could it be read to apply-to prevailing testers seek-
ing attorneys' fees unless the employer had a mixed motive 
for the disparate treatment of the testers. 189 
Professor Clark acknowledges, as I originally wrote, that 
the provision was passed by Congress in response to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 190 
There the Court held that a plaintiff who showed that an 
action taken by her employer was motivated both by unlaw-
ful discrimination and lawful considerations was entitled to 
no relief if the employer proved it would have made the same 
decision absent the unlawful motive. 191 In contrast, section 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) was intended to permit a district court to 
grant to plaintiffs in these so-called "mixed motive" cases the 
attorneys' fees generated in establishing the employer's 
hostile work environment, while negligent, was not a callous or reckless disregard of 
the plaintiff's rights). 
187. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 444-45 & nn. 191-96. However, Justice O'Connor, 
concurring in Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992), wrote that a nominal damage 
award might support a grant offees, considering "the extent ofrelief, the significance 
of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served." Id. 
at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). I suggested in my original article that under Justice 
O'Connor's reasoning "testers might be entitled to attorneys' fees if they recover 
nominal damages." Yelnosky,.supra note 2, at 442 n.179. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, in Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 1994), recently adopted 
the test from Justice O'Connor's concurrence and awarded $10,000 in attorneys' fees 
in a prisoner's excessive force case where the plaintiff recovered $1 in compensatory 
damages and $1 in punitive damages. Id. at 423-24. If Justice O'Connor's test became 
the prevailing view of the Supreme Court's attorneys' fees jurisprudence, I might be 
more optimistic about the chances for prevailing testers to recoup their fees as a mat-
ter of course. However, one student author recently suggested an award of attorneys' 
fees would not be a sufficient incentive for tester plaintiffs because the cost of ad-
ministering a tester program would not be recoverable as attorneys' fees. Navarro, 
supra note 180, at 2736. 
188. Clark, supra note 1, at 32-34. 
189. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 445 n.196. 
190. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
191. Id. at 242, 258. 
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unlawful motivation, even if the employer met its burden of 
proving that it would have come to the same conclusion 
absent the discriminatory motive.192 
Professor Clark suggests that I have read incorrectly this 
provision to authorize attorneys' fees only in mixed motive 
cases.193 To the contrary, "[i]n passing this section ... Con-
gress's clear intent was to deal with situations in which mixed 
motives existed at the time the employer made the decision."194 
The language of the provision reflects that intent. A court may 
grant the limited fees authorized by section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
if the plaintiff "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice"195 and the "respondent demonstrates that the respondent 
would have taken the same action in the absence of the im-
permissible motivating factor."196 Plainly, then, "[s]ection 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) ... applies only to mixed-motive Title VII 
cases in which the defendant proves that the same decision 
would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory 
motive."197 
Professor Clark incorrectly asserts that prevailing testers will 
be able to avail themselves of this provision even if they are not 
arguing that they received unequal treatment because of mixed 
motives. I agree with Professor Clark that in one way the 
prevailing tester plaintiff and the prevailing mixed motive 
plaintiff are. similarly situated: they both prove that the 
employer engaged in discriminatory behavior. 198 That similarity, 
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing that a court may grant attorneys' 
fees and costs "directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 
2000e-2(m)," which provides that it is unlawful to base an employment decision on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, "even though other factors also 
motivated the practice." Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
193. Clark, supra note 1, at 33. 
194. Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of A~er­
Acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 191 (1993); see also 
H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45-49 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-87 (allowing courts to award attorneys' fees and other ap-
propriate relief in cases where the employee demonstrates discrimination but fails 
to establish it as the sole cause). 
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). 
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). 
197. Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1369, 1375 (D. 
Md. 1994). 
198. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 445 n.196 (noting that an underlying premise of 
the provision is that an individual who proves that the employer's acts were incon-
sistent with Title Vll's proscriptions should be entitled to attorneys' fees expended 
in proving that case). 
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however, does not change the plain language of the statute. A 
tester is only a mixed motive plaintiff if the tester was treated 
in a discriminatory manner for lawful and unlawful reasons. A 
prevailing party tester ordinarily proves her Title VII rights 
were violated by showing that an impermissible factor such as 
race was the reason she received disparate treatment. That she 
may not be entitled to relief sufficient to obtain attorneys' fees 
does not transform her case to one based on mixed motives. 
Congress "neither contemplated nor condoned using the carefully 
crafted mixed motives standard in cases in which the employer 
did not even know about the [lawful] reason [for disparate 
treatment at the time the decision was made] ."199 Professor 
Clark's assertion that Congress could not have intended the 
prevailing "single motive" tester plaintiff to be in a worse 
position than the prevailing mixed-motive plaintiff simply 
ignores the fact that Congress did not consider the issue.200 
Finally, Professor Clark challenges my expressed concern 
that relying on private groups and individuals to engage in an 
optimal amount of testing might be unwise because employers 
might deter private groups and individuals from using testers 
by asserting various claims against them. 201 I speculated that 
employers might sue testers and their counsel for breach of 
contract or fraud, or argue that their conduct violates ethical, 
criminal, or civil common-law proscriptions on conduct. that 
"stirs up litigation" or bars attorneys from contacting 
represented parties. 202 Although my concerns were somewhat 
speculative and discussed out of an abundance of caution, I 
accurately predicted that employers might assert such claims. 
Recently, defendants in a housing discrimination case 
brought by testers asserted RICO counterclaims against the 
plaintiffs.203 Although the court ultimately dismissed these 
199. McGinley, supra note 194, at 191-92. 
· 200. Even if the intent and language of section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) could be inter-
preted to apply it to situations that do not involve mixed motives, district courts are 
not required to award fees under the provision. See, e.g., Lewis v. American Foreign 
Serv. Ass'n, 846 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1993). Relying on Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 556 
(1992), the Lewis court denied fees to a mixed-motive plaintiff because in section 
2000e-5(g}(2}(B) "Congress's use of the word 'may'" in relation to a court's granting 
attorneys' fees, "clearly indicates that the Court may exercise its discretion when 
awarding the relief allocated in the statute." Lewis, 846 F. Supp. at 83 n.8. 
201. Clark, supra note 1, at 34 (commenting on Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 451). 
202. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 446-59. 
203. In Heights Community Congress v. Smythe, Cramer Co., 862 F. Supp. 204 
(N.D. Ohio 1994), the defendant real estate company asserted counterclaims against 
the plaintiff testers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
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claims, 204 that case is ample evidence that my concerns about 
claims being asserted against testers to deter the use of the 
practice are not idle ruminations. Therefore, Professor Clark's 
comments about some of the other claims that might be 
asserted against testers warrant some response. 
First, he asserts that "[m]any of [my] claims regarding 
potential unethical activity have been refuted" in a recent 
law review article by Alex Oh.205 Professor Clark fails to 
mention that Oh concluded that counsel who organize testing 
activities may engage in unethical conduct in what would 
appear to be a very common testing scenario. 206 Oh reasoned 
that an attorney might violate ethical proscriptions against 
misrepresentation if the attorney was responsible for altering 
facts on a tester's resume, and the employer offered a job to 
the tester, relying on the misrepresentation.207 Oh also recog-
niZed, as I had suggested,208 that lawyers and other private 
parties engaged in testing are more likely to run afoul of 
ethical proscriptions when they engage in testing for their 
own pecuniary gain. 209 
I continue to think it prudent to acknowledge the potential 
problems with relying exclusively on the private market to 
produce the optimum amount and type of employment testing 
to improve the enforcement regime of Title VII. At times, 
Professor Clark himself seems to acknowledge these prob-
lems. He states that public policy concerns about misrepre-
sentations made in the course of testing should encourage 
Congress to authorize the EEOC to determine when and how 
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and Ohio's Corrupt Ac-
tivities Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31-.36 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994), 
arguing that the testers' organization "used settlement demands and threats to sue 
merely for the purpose of fund-raising." 862 F. Supp. at 207. 
204. Heights Community Congress, 862 F. Supp. at 207. 
205. Clark, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Oh, supra note 63). 
206. Oh, supra note 63, at 489. Clark also neglects to mention that Oh concluded 
that testers who act in a way to encourage employers to reject them "entrap" the 
employers. Id. a,t 503-04. In light of that concern, Oh argued for EEOC coordination 
and oversight. Id. at 504. I argued in my original article and still believe that 
testing does not constitute entrapment, Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 474-81, but I 
also argued then, as I do now, that EEOC oversight and coordination of testing 
activities in the employment area is desirable. Id. at 483. Clark agrees with me. 
Clark, supra note 1, at 38-40. 
207. Oh, supra note 63, at 487 n.61. 
208. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 451-52. 
209. Oh, supra note 63, at 490. 
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misrepresentations may be made in employment testing.210 
He is similarly ambivalent in responding to my conclusion 
that the state law hurdles that could be placed in the way of 
private testers would not be preempted by Title VIl.211 He 
claims in one section of his article that "if federal law gives 
private parties a right to test to litigate against employment 
discrimination, then these state law claims will be preempted 
if they unduly burdened that right."212 Later, however, he 
writes that "[a]rguments that state legislation which prohib-
its misrepresentations in the employment application process 
were preempted would probably fail. "213 Regardless of where 
Professor Clark ultimately comes out on this issue, I stand by 
my previous. analysis of it. 214 
210. I first expressed the concern about liability for misrepresentation in my 
original article. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 449-50. I also suggested that Congress 
should legislate in this area. Id. at 482-83. 
211. Id. at 471-73. 
212. Clark, supra note 1, at 35. 
213. Id. at 48 n.238. 
214. Professor Clark tries to dismiss most of the concerns I raised about a 
tester's lack of interest in employment with the tested employer by asserting that 
"[t)esters are not that different from bona fide applicants who ultimately turn down 
a job offer." Clark, supra note 1, at 35. They can be undeniably different, however, 
with regard to their intent to consider accepting an offer of employment. I recog-
nized in my earlier article that applicants often test the waters to see if other 
employment opportunities are available and otherwise solicit offers they are not 
serious about accepting. Therefore, it is customary that the employer runs the risk 
in the initial stages of considering whether to offer a job to an applicant that the 
applicant is not serious about entertaining an offer of employment. Yelnosky, supra 
note 2, at 450 n.218. However, if the applicant becomes aware that the employer is 
expending significant amounts of time and money considering his suitability for 
employment or may be bypassing other qualified candidates, which is often the case 
in the latter stages of hiring for higher-skilled, upper-level positions, there may be 
liability in tort for failing to disclose the lack of a good faith intention to consider an 
offer. Id. 
Professor Clark implies that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said 
something important about the relief issues in Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th 
Cir. 1971). Clark, supra note 1, at 37 n.185. Professor Clark's reasoning here is 
difficult to follow. In Lea the court held that the district court erred in concluding 
that tester plaintiffs who prevailed in a Title VII action in obtaining an injunction 
against defendant's discriminatory hiring practices were not entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees. Lea, 438 F.2d at 88. The case has no precedential value on the 
attorneys' fees issue, because it was decided some 20 years before the Supreme 
Court articulated its current attorneys' fees jurisprudence. If Professor Clark is 
suggesting that the court in Lea addressed the issue of tester standing, he is simply 
wrong. Standing questions were not relevant to the posture of that case, and the 
court never mentioned any standing issues. See, e.g., Oh, supra note 63, at 4 78 n.21. 
("The majority opinion did not address the issueO of standing .... Consequently, 
the decision serves only a minor role in assessing the present controversy."). 
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IV. THE FAIR HOUSING INITIATIVES PROGRAM 
After sorting through Professor Clark's article, I have con-
cluded that he agrees with my central conclusions: the EEOC 
should take some leadership role in implementing enforce-
ment testing to uncover hiring discrimination, 215 and some 
congressional action is necessary in this area. 216 
Professor Clark recognizes that testing programs should be 
as fair as possible and acknowledges (1) the public policy im-
plications of testers misrepresenting their qualifications,217 
(2) the additional costs to employers associated with checking 
all of an applicant's statements to determine whether the ap-
plicant submitted a false application,218 (3) the possible cost 
an employer might incur by hiring and then having to fire an 
unqualified tester,219 and (4) the threat of tester liability for 
misrepresentations made to employers concerning job qual-
ifications. 220 He responds to these concerns, in part, by arguing 
for EEOC oversight and congressional action,221 recognizing 
that some of the state law obstacles to testing by private 
parties may be preempted if Congress specifically authorized 
the practice.222 He also writes: 
Arguably, either the EEOC should be the only entity al-
lowed to arm its staff with false credentials, or other or-
ganizations should be required to obtain approval from 
the EEOC. Because the employment testing process is 
much more complicated than testing in the housing are-
na, Congress should consider funding the EEOC to pro-
vide training and guidance to private organizations.223 
While he suggests that employers should not be targeted for 
testing unless there is some reason to believe that they are 
currently engaged in discriminatory hiring practices, he fails 
to recognize that this limitation would require legislative 
215. See Clark, supra note 1, at 38-40. 
216. Id. at 46-48. 
217. Id. at 47-48. 
218. Id. at 48. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 46. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 35. 
223. Id. at 48. 
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action. 224 Professor Clark also states that the EEOC should 
share information with others in order to help testers avoid 
targeting employers who are not likely to be engaged in dis-
criminatory hiring practices. 225 
As I stated earlier, I think Professor Clark's time could 
have been better spent if he had acknowledged that he 
agreed with much of what I had written and used more of his 
response to my article to prompt a dialogue that would give 
the EEOC and Congress real guidance in reconsidering the 
role of the EEOC in enforcing Title VII, and the possible 
place for enforcement testing in a new vision of that role. 
Now that I have clarified where we really stand on these 
issues, I want to highlight an existing_ model of public/private 
partnership in the enforcement of federal civil rights legisla-
tion through the use of testers-the Fair Housing Initiatives 
Program (FHIP).226 Congress should consider adopting a 
similar program to organize and utilize enforcement testing 
in employment in a more meaningful and systematic way. 
Many of the arguments Professor Clark and I have made 
here suffer from a lack of empirical support. In some ways, as 
I suggested, some of our differences are really based on a 
more or less optimistic prediction of future events. He agrees 
with me that testing is necessary, that it can be reliable and 
cost-efficient when utilized properly, and that it should be 
used in instances where it fills an existing enforcement void. 
The best way to move us forward from here is to gather more 
empirical data to support conclusions on the proper context of 
employment law enforcement testing. A program like the 
FHIP can do that. 227 
Congress authorized the FHIP in section 561 of the Fair 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987.228 Under 
the FHIP the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
224. See supra notes 103-12, 117-19 and accompanying text. 
225. Clark, supra note 1, at 38. 
226. 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (Supp. V 1993). 
227. I am not the first to suggest the FHIP could be a model for incorporating 
the testing technique into the EEOC's enforcement strategy. See, e.g., Penda D. 
Hair, Civil Rights, in CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRA-
TION 334, 340 (Mark Green ed., 1992) (arguing that as part of an aggressive enforce-
ment program, the Clinton Administration should support a federally funded 
employment testing effort by developing the employment equivalent of the FHIP 
program); Fix et al., supra note 37, at 45 (suggesting that policy makers should 
consider whether it is appropriate for the federal government to help build an in-
frastructure of private organizations to resemble the fair housing councils). 
228. 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (Supp. V 1993). 
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was authorized to provide funds to non-profit organizations 
or other private entities "to conduct a variety of activities, 
including testing, in support of fair housing enforcement."229 
The program was authorized as a two-year demonstration to 
provide Congress with an opportunity to review the actual 
experiences with the program.230 During this period, the 
Secretary was directed to "establish guidelines for testing ac-
tivities funded under the private enforcement initiative ... to 
ensure that investigations in support of fair housing enforce-
ment efforts . . . develop credible and objective evidence of 
discriminatory housing practices."231 The conference commit-
tee that reported out the final bill urged the Secretary, when 
preparing the testing guidelines, to: 
give particular consideration to the comments and sugges-
tions of both housing industry members (including those 
that have been the subjects of testing or otherwise involved 
in the testing process) and of private and public agencies 
that have practical experience in the use of testing as an 
instrument for securing rights under fair housing laws. 232 
Under the statute, the guidelines applied only to activities 
funded by the Secretary. Thus, the guidelines were intended 
to have no impact on the use of evidence secured through test-
ing not funded by the Secretary in any legal proceeding 
brought to secure a right or remedy available under the federal 
fair housing laws. Those guidelines233 set forth (1) specific 
229. H.R. REP. No. 122(1), lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3406. 
230. Id. at 293, 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3444. The Secretary was required to file a 
quarterly report with the relevant House and Senate committees detailing the ac-
tivities funded under the section. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561(b)(2), 101 Stat. 1942, 
1943 (1988). 
231. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561(c)(2), 101 Stat. 1942, 1943 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a(0(2)(Supp. V 1993)). According to the House Report 
on the bill, the Secretary's guidelines were to "(1) contain measures necessary to 
ensure that such testing [was) objective, reliable, and controlled; (2) guarantee the 
credibility and probative value of testing evidence; and (3) preclude the misuse of 
the funds under the Program." H.R. REP. No. 122(1), supra note 229, at 90-91, 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3406-07. The Committee stated explicitly that the Secretary should 
not interfere with any remedies currently provided under federal fair housing laws. 
Id. at 91, 19.87 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3407. 
232. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 426, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3458, 3537. 
233. The guidelines for testing funded under the FHIP are codified at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 125.405 (1994). 
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applicant eligibility requirements, (2) a detailed description of 
procedures to be followed in the conduct of funded testing, and 
(3) performance monitoring requirements. For example, the 
guidelines address the targeting issue. Funded testing may 
only be conducted in response to a bona fide allegation of a 
discriminatory housing practice.234 The agency justified this 
limitation on the ground that the program was a demonstration 
of limited duration with limited financial resources that Con-
gress supported to enforce the fair housing laws, not to conduct 
research into the extent of housing discrimination. 235 
The guidelines address reliability and tester matching issues 
as well. In an attempt to establish a method of obtaining 
credible and objective evidence through funded fair housing 
testing, the guidelines specify how many testers must visit an 
entity targeted by a bona fide allegation. The guidelines also 
address how closely the testers' characteristics and alleged 
housing needs must match those of the individual who made the 
bona fide allegation or those of the other testers.236 A funded 
program may not recruit as a tester any individual with a prior 
felony conviction or a conviction of a crime involving fraud or 
perjury.237 The guidelines forbid a tester or funded organization 
from having an economic interest in the outcome of the test 
other than any interest in damages that may be' awarded by a 
court for a fair housing law violation. 238 They also forbid any 
other "bias or conflict of interest which would prevent or limit 
[the] objectivity or fairness [of the test]."239 Testers are forbidden 
from contacting each other during testing about the conduct of 
the test, testing experiences, or results. 240 The agency uses an 
application process to try to assure that funded organizations 
234. Id. § 125.405(b)(l). 
235. Fair Housing Initiatives Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 6492 (1989) (codified at 24 
C.F.R. § 125 (1994)). As discussed, Professor Clark would target employers for testing 
if minorities or women were statistically underrepresented in their workforces. Clark, 
supra note 1, at 24 n.119. Other targeting techniques have been suggested, such as 
a history of discrimination, tips from any source, jobs involving substantial contact 
with the public, or jobs that are valuable or plentiful. Boggs et al., supra note 15, at 
355. There are proponents of purely random testing, e.g., Hair, supra note 227, at 
338-39, but critics fear that without strict guidelines, testing could be used for ulterior 
motives. Millspaugh, supra note 65, at 239. 
236. 24 C.F.R. § 125.405(b)(3),(c)(2)(iii),(iv) (1994). 
237. Id. § 125.405(c)(l). 
238. Id. § 125.405(c)(3)(i). 
239. Id. § 125.405(c)(3)(ii). 
240. Id. § 125.405(c)(2)(ii). 
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have experience in the area and will follow the funding 
guidelines. 241 
In 1990, Congress reauthorized the program and funded it to 
extend the demonstration period to September 30, 1992.242 
Congress reauthorized and amended the program most recently 
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992.243 
Congress removed the demonstration period provision, establish-
ing the FHIP as a permanent program. It determined that 
testing "is a valid and necessary component of fair housing 
investigative and enforcement activities."244 The Secretary is 
currently undertaking a review of the testing guidelines. 245 
Congress made other relevant changes to the FHIP in 1992. 
It authorized the Secretary of HUD to use funds to develop, 
organize, and build the capacity of existing fair housing or-
ganizations to engage in investigative activities and to form 
and establish new organizations246 in unserved or underserved 
areas as well as areas where there are large concentrations of 
members of protected classes. 247 Congress also · expressed 
enthusiasm for expanding the use of testers to uncover dis-
crimination in mortgage lend1.ng practices248 and specifically 
authorized the Secretary to fund testing intended to uncover 
discrimination in "the making or purchasing of loans or the 
provision of other financial assistance."249 The Secretary will 
241. Id. § 125.405(d). 
242. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 
§ 953(a),(b), 104 Stat. 4419 (1990). 
243. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905, 106 Stat. 3638 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a 
(Supp. V 1993)). 
244. 59 Fed. Reg. 44,598 (1994). 
245. Because the testing guidelines were to be used during the authorized 
demonstration period, and because that period expired, HUD is proposing to eliminate 
most of the testing guidelines. It will still require that testers have no prior felony 
convictions or convictions of crimes involving fraud or perjury and that the testers 
receive training or be experienced in testing procedures or techniques. Id. at 44,596. 
246. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905(b)(2), 106 Stat. 3869 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3616a (b)(2)(A),(C),(D) (Supp. V 1993)). 
247. 59 Fed. Reg. 44,600 (1994). In issuing rules under these provisions, HUD 
intends to make "this category of funding broadly available," 59 Fed. Reg. 44,601 
(1994), and to target areas identified by, inter alia, "the amount of funds available; 
the absence in an area of substantially equivalent State or local agencies, or private 
enforcement groups; and the presence of large concentrations of protected classes." 
Id. 
248. H.R. REP. No. 760, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1992), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281, 3437. 
249. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § &05(b)(2)(B), 106 Stat. 3869 (1992) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 3616a(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993)). 
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be required to report to Congress annually on the administra-
tion of the program. 250 
CONCLUSION 
A funded testing program modeled along the lines of the 
FHIP seems to be a desirable next step in the development of 
the use of testers to enforce equal employment opportunity 
laws. The program can be used as a model for Congress and 
the EEOC to begin to integrate this new enforcement technique 
into the Title VII arsenal. The period of deliberation by Con-
gress, as well as the subsequent public comment period as-
sociated with any EEOC rulemaking, are opportunities to air, 
debate, and test some of the issues Professor Clark and I, as 
well as others, have discussed here and elsewhere. Perhaps 
through the use of a demonstration period like that originally 
authorized under the FHIP we can move beyond speculation 
and conjecture and begin to produce the empirical evidence 
necessary to evaluate usefully the efficacy of using testers to 
uncover and remedy discrimination in hiring. 
Issues such as the efficacy of testing for discrimination in 
hiring for higher-skilled jobs can be debated, tested, and hope-
fully revisited. Various techniques for targeting firms for test-
ing can be debated and tested. More debate and empirical data 
on the need for misrepresentations of qualifications and the 
permissible types of misrepresentations in testing are 
necessary. Funds could be used, as they were in the FHIP, to 
develop more organizations capable of conducting reliable 
employment testing to further fill the Title VII enforcement 
void. Finally, by permitting unfunded groups to operate simul-
taneously,251 which I assume Professor Clark would prefer, the 
250. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905(j), 106 Stat. 3872 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3616a(j) (Supp. V 1993)). 
251. For several reasons, I took the position in my original article that there would 
be benefits to comprehensive congressional legislation in this area to set the permis-
sible boundaries and techniques of employment law enforcement testing. For example, 
testing could be limited to uncovering discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-
level jobs; disincentives caused by the inability of parties to recover attorneys' fees 
could be changed through legislation; and state law obstacles to testing could be 
preempted. Yelnosky, supra note 2, at 483. A program like FHIP would be a more 
incremental approach, permitting the use of testing to evolve as our understanding 
of potential costs and benefits increases. 
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law may be permitted to develop in this area and funded test-
ing can continue unabated so that ifl am right that incentives 
to promote testing are not sufficient, the technique will con-
tinue to be developed. 
My final point, then, is a simple one. While I welcome the 
opportunity Professor Clark's article has given me to discuss 
further the ideas I first presented in my original article, to 
move forward from here we need to concentrate on developing 
and implementing the testing technique. Only then can we 
hope to make truly wise decisions about the efficacy of this 
practice. 
